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What about local climate governance? 
A review of promise and problems 
 
 
Abstract 
A large proportion of greenhouse gas emissions is produced in urban areas, particularly in 
high income countries. Cities are also vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and 
particularly so in developing countries. Therefore, local climate policies for mitigation and 
adaptation have to play an important role in any effective global climate protection strategy. 
Based upon a systematic literature review, this article gives a comprehensive overview of 
motivation and challenges for local climate governance. A large part of the literature focuses 
on mitigation and cities in industrialized countries. The review also includes the smaller and 
emerging body of literature on adaptation and cities in developing or industrializing countries. 
Motivations and challenges we find fall into broad categories like ‘economic’, 
‘informational’, ‘institutional’, ‘liveability’ or ‘political/cultural’. We conclude that the mix of 
motivation and challenges is city-specific, and that the national framework conditions are 
important. It matters, whether cities engage in mitigation or adaptation policies, whether they 
are located in developing, industrializing or industrialized countries, and at which stage of 
climate policy-making cities are. For many cities, cost savings are a primary motivation for 
local mitigation policies, while perceived vulnerability and a commitment to development is 
the primary motivator for adaptation policies. The collective action problem of climate 
protection (also known as ‘Tragedy of the Commons’) and inappropriate legal frameworks are 
key barriers to mitigation policies. Challenges for adaptation include financial constraints, and 
a lack of expertise, cooperation, leadership and political support. 
Understanding their specific motivation and challenges may support cities in developing 
appropriate local climate action plans. Furthermore, the understanding of motivation and 
challenges can inform other policy levels that want to help realize the local climate protection 
potential. 
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1. Local policies for global problems? 
 
Cities affected by climate change and cities producing greenhouse gas emissions 
Climate protection is an urban issue in two ways: Firstly, people living in urban areas, and in 
developing country cities in particular, are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Large 
coastal cities such as Buenos Aires, Hamburg, London, Mumbai, New York, Shanghai, St 
Petersburg, and Tokyo are at risk from rising sea levels (Stern 2006). Loss of glaciers in the 
Himalayas or the Andes is putting the water supply of hundreds of millions in peril, including 
cities such as Calcutta, New Delhi, Quito, LaPaz, and Bogota (UNEP / World Glacier 
Monitoring Service 2008). Extreme weather events like the heat wave in Europe in the 
summer of 2003, may hit hardest on the urban population (Sippel 2008). Secondly, a high 
proportion of greenhouse gas emissions originates from urban activities, 1 particular in high 
income countries.  
 
Relevance of the city level 
Regardless of the urban dimension of climate change, so far the climate policy debate has 
focused primarily on the international level, and negotiations of the UNFCCC, Kyoto 
Protocol, and an agreement for the Post-Kyoto era. The debate has often neglected the 
implementation level of climate policies which is the local level. Emissions from energy use, 
transport, industrial processes or waste management are produced in cities, and urban 
planning, infrastructure and local emergency management are instrumental to build climate 
resilience. There is probably a need for national and international mitigation policies such as 
carbon taxes or emission trading schemes – and such policies can make the realization of local 
mitigation policies easier (Collier 1997). Local adaptation activities, too, may benefit from 
support of other policy levels (Mukheibir, Ziervogel 2007, p156). However, there are good 
arguments for climate governance on the local level: (1) Local authorities have 
responsibilities in relation to topics like land use planning or public transportation, which can 
help them to implement mitigation activities. (Dodman 2009, p198). (2) Cities are the policy 
level closest to the people. They may thus be best suited to mobilize people’s support for the 
type of economic and societal transformation needed to achieve large emission reductions, 
and for inclusive adaptation policies (Jones et al. 2000, p210; Lutsey, Sperling, 2008, p674). 
(3) Climate protection needs localized mitigation and adaptation policies. The city level 
allows for tailored and specific actions that are based on local expertise (Lutsey, Sperling, 
2008, p674). (4) The concentration of people and business as well as high settlement densities 
in large cities may provide the opportunity for technological innovations e.g. combined heat 
and power energy supply (Jenssen 2009, p183). Cities may also be a breeding ground for 
                                                 
1 There is no universally accepted definition of which emissions should be attributed to a city, with some inventories based on 
emissions from urban production and others based on urban consumption (Dodman 2009, 194ff). Depending on the definition 
chosen, the share of urban greenhouse gas emissions worldwide is estimated to be between about 30 and 40% and up to 75 or 
80% (Satterthwaite 2008, p539, 543). 
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policy innovations. They offer a ‘test market’ for creative and experimental climate policies 
(Alber, Kern 2009, p2; Lutsey, Sperling, 2008, p674; Dodman 2009, p198). 
 
Stakeholders and modes of governing 
A variety of local stakeholders may contribute to climate protection activities. Local 
authorities may involve citizens and civil society groups, local business, scientists, the media, 
and professionals e.g. in the building sector (Carmin et al. 2009, piii; Fleming, Webber, 2004, 
p765; Schröder, Bulkeley, 2009, p359; Tanner et al. 2009, p43). Bulkeley and Kern (2006, 
p2243) have identified different modes of climate governance for a local authority. These are: 
• self-governing (e.g. measures targeting a local authority’s own buildings and fleet, or 
green procurement), 
• enabling (supporting other stakeholders, e.g. by information campaigns or subsidies 
for green buildings), 
• provision of services (like energy supply, waste management and public transport), 
and 
• authority (e.g. by establishing energy efficient building standards for new 
constructions or by introducing a congestion fee for motorized travel in the city 
center). 
 
Achievements 
While there is a significant potential for local climate protection, and various modes which 
can be instrumental in realizing it, the potential of local climate protection seems to be far 
from being realized. The number of cities engaging in adaptation activities is still very limited 
and mitigation achievements are rather poor – although local mitigation activities have 
become more common over the last two decades. 
In the Asian mega-cities Tokyo, Beijing, Shanghai and Seoul, most local greenhouse gas 
policies seem to be reactive, short-term and ad-hoc, rather than proactive and long-term 
(Dhakal 2004, p82). In the United States, while more and more cities do adopt reduction 
targets, those cities’ actual mitigation performance “falls far short of the much deeper long-
term cuts that will be needed for global climate stabilization” (Lutsey, Sperling, 2008, p683). 
Cities in the United Kingdom seem to have moved forward in areas where they have direct 
control, while “more complex and strategic activities such as energy policy [...] and 
greenhouse gas emissions inventories and targets [...] show little progress.” (Allman et al. 
2004, p276). These findings are supported by Bulkeley and Kern (2006, p2242), who report 
that in Germany and in the UK the “majority of measures undertaken in relation to climate 
protection are concentrated in the self-governing mode and in the energy sector, in particular 
in the energy management of municipal properties.” However, emissions from municipal 
buildings usually represent only a small share of a city’s overall emissions, e.g. in the range of 
2-5% in German cities (Kern et al. 2005, p83). In contrast to the limited achievements in most 
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countries, the example of Sweden between 1970 and 1990 shows that a 40% cut of CO2 
emissions over a 20 year period is possible – in the case of Sweden enabled by fiscal 
mechanisms like CO2 and gasoline taxes, subsidies for renewable energy sources as well as 
energy conservation (Collier, Löfstedt 1997, p31). 
It seems, that while there is a large urban climate protection potential – both for adaptation 
and mitigation, to date this potential is far from being realized. This is alarming in the light of 
IPCC reports which show that deep emission cuts will be required in order to limit the adverse 
effects of climate change. This leads us to two questions: 
(1) What drives local climate governance? 
(2) Which barriers do local climate policies face? 
Based on a literature review on local climate protection activities, this article provides an 
overview of motivations and challenges for local climate policies. The review is based on 
more than 90 articles and other publications. The literature reviewed includes surveys of over 
4,000 cities and case studies from all continents. The articles were selected by the authors in 
such a way as to cover different geographic regions, both mitigation and adaptation 
governance, and different research disciplines.  
The article is structured as follows: (2) briefly describes the conceptual framework guiding 
the research, (3) and (4) discuss motivations and challenges for local climate policies, (5) 
provides results and (6) some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Research design 
 
Conceptual framework: motivation and challenges 
This article analyses case studies, surveys and other academic literature on local climate 
governance by using the concept of motivation and challenges. On the one hand, cities and 
local policy makers may have a certain motivation to implement climate policies. On the other 
hand, the limited achievements of local climate protection activities suggest that local climate 
governance faces challenges or barriers. Motivations can be broadly categorised into 
‘economic’, ‘informational’, ‘liveability’ and ‘political/cultural’. Barriers can be classified as 
‘economic’, ‘institutional’, ‘informational’, and ‘political/cultural’. Motivations and barriers 
may belong to more than one of these categories. For example, one of the barriers identified is 
‘path dependency’, which has both a political/cultural and an economic dimension. There may 
be a relationship between specific motivation and barriers. For instance, financial 
considerations play an important role, both when the ‘cost-saving’ argument serves as a 
motivator for local climate governance, or when climate action is hindered by costs of climate 
policies and limited financial resources. One would assume that cities with scarce financial 
resources are particularly keen on realizing cost-savings through their climate action. 
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However the relationship and interdependence between motivators and barriers is not always 
that clear. 
 
Adaptation and mitigation, and low, middle and high income countries 
Much of the literature focuses on local mitigation activities in high income countries. 
However, there is a growing body of studies that do include experiences from local adaptation 
policies, as well as local mitigation policies in low and middle income countries. This is partly 
a consequence of climate change impacts beginning to affect cities, and adaptation becomes 
ever more important for local policy-making. Furthermore, cities in rapidly developing 
countries such as Beijing or Shanghai in China already do have per-capita emissions that are 
as high as in cities in industrialized countries (Kennedy et al. 2009, table 3). Those cities will 
need to contribute to global mitigation efforts, soon. The article includes material on 
adaptation, and on mitigation in low and middle income countries. Due to the limited amount 
of research in these areas, the findings for adaptation and mitigation in low and middle 
income country cities are less robust than those for local mitigation activities in industrialized 
countries. Adaptation activities like flood protection may also be already taken by cities, 
without being declared and perceived as ‘climate action’. Such adaptation activities may not 
be documented well in the body of literature on local climate governance. 
Under a conceptual framework of motivation and barriers, one needs to differentiate between 
adaptation and mitigation: While results of adaptation activities benefit a city directly, the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions contributes to global efforts to stabilize emissions in 
the atmosphere. Therefore, one would expect to find different motivations and barriers for 
mitigation and adaptation policies of one and the same city. The development background of a 
city may matter, too. Probably, it makes a difference, whether a city is in a low, middle or 
high income country. Furthermore, there may be a difference between cities in an early stage 
of local climate governance and cities that are more advanced. The literature is somewhat 
biased towards the latter, i.e. more advanced cities, as they are more frequently subject to case 
studies. 
 
 
3. Motivation of local governments 
 
The following section summarizes motivators for local climate governance as identified in the 
literature on local climate policies. We follow a definition of Qi et al. who define the 
motivation of a local government as “the collective expression of the motivation of key 
government officials, that is, top leaders in the government.“ (Qi et al. 2008, p390). Of 
course, the motivation of local governments differs, and the mix of motivators is specific for 
each city. For example, it may depend on geographical and development background, 
economic structure, social setting, or preferences of individual key decision-makers. 
Differences in motivation may also depend on the given legislative framework in a country. 
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Take for example Germany, were government officials are elected by local citizens, and 
China, were government officals are selected by higher government levels. While German 
local politicians gain political (and thereby economic) rewards by meeting the wishes of their 
citizens, the careers of Chinese local politicians depend on how well they meet upper-level 
governments’ demands. 
A lot of the articles and studies reviewed do not elaborate on the motivation of cities 
explicitly. However, the narrative of a city’s climate governance does often include hints on a 
city’s motivation.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the motivators identified. This list of motivators is not 
inclusive. The selection mainly followed the frequency of citations in the literature, and other 
motivators certainly exist. Other motivators include altruism, as reported from Toronto, 
Canada. City commissioners in Toronto said they were motivated by a concern over the 
general well-being of future generations for the next several centuries (Lambright et al. 1996, 
p467). Although altruism is not frequently cited in the literature, one may well imagine that 
altruism is a motivator for individual city officials to promote the climate issue on the urban 
agenda. 
 
Table 1: Motivators for local climate governance – Overview 
Economic Liveability Political / Cultural Informational 
Cost savings 
Revenues 
Smart growth 
Air quality 
Traffic congestion 
Urban warming 
Social aspects 
External pressure and 
trickle down 
Internal pressure 
Reputation 
Trend-setting 
Perceived vulnerability 
Source: Literature review 
 
 
Adaptation – Mitigation 
The analysis of motivators for local climate governance has to distinguish between mitigation 
and adaptation activities. Because the greenhouse effect of emissions occurs globally and 
independent of their place of origin, local mitigation measures lead to very small benefits for 
everybody in the world. Significant emission reductions can only be achieved by collective 
action of cities and nation states all over the world, and each city will benefit from such 
emission reductions – also if it refused to participate in the mitigation effort. In contrast, local 
adaptation activities address local climate change impacts like flooding, heat waves or heavy 
rainfall. These impacts are already affecting communities today. Therefore the benefit of 
adaptation activities can be direct. 
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Local Co-benefits 
As explained above, mitigation policies are connected to a collective action problem (Tragedy 
of the Commons). It is therefore not surprising, that local co-benefits play an important role as 
motivators. According to Schreurs, “Local government climate change actions are usually 
framed to aid with achieving multiple goals at once (e.g. energy efficiency in China or job 
creation through retrofitting of buildings in German cities).” (Schreurs 2008, p353). The 
international city network ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability) has experience with 
climate governance in over 1,000 cities members to its Cities for Climate Protection 
Campaign (CCP). It concludes that co-benefits may often be the primary reason for taking 
emission reduction action (ICLEI 2008, p6). Similarly, and in the earlier years of research on 
local climate governance, Lambright et al. found that local mitigation policies had a greater 
constituency, when the city of Toronto, Canada began to take their co-benefits into 
consideration (Lambright et al. 1996, p469). Interestingly, the perception of co-benefits may 
be more important than their actual realization, as “local governments do not typically attempt 
to value or quantify them.” (Kousky, Schneider 2003, p370). 
 
 
3.1 Economic motivators 
 
Cost-effectiveness of climate policies is an important criterion for city officials. While 
measures may lead to direct cost savings or even generate revenues, they may also have 
economic benefits that are more difficult to quantify – summarized in this section under 
‘smart growth’. 
 
Cost savings 
Local climate protection activities can result in cost savings. For example, energy efficiency 
measures can reduce operating and maintenance costs, and thus lead to considerable economic 
savings. Such cost savings seem to be a powerful motivator for local climate governance. 
According to Betsill “Cost-effectiveness is the ultimate criterion on which city councils [in 
the US, note by the authors] make budget decisions. It is thus important for city officials 
requesting money for climate related projects to demonstrate the economic benefits.” (Betsill 
2001, p401). The cost saving argument seems to motivate climate action in cities all over the 
world: It is reported for the Canadian city of Toronto, which has taken early climate action 
(Harvey 1993, p16; Lambright et al. 1996, p468), as well as for cities participating in ICLEI’s 
Cities for Climate Protection Campaign in the US. For the latter Kousky and Schneider find 
that for 19 out of 23 cities analysed, cost savings were the reason to take climate action 
(Kousky, Schneider 2003, p365f.). Kern et al. analysed three German cities which are 
perceived as climate champions. They explain the success of these cities with the fact that 
they have consistently linked climate policies to cost-reductions (Kern et al. 2005, p88). 
Chinese local governments follow the same pattern when they strive for energy savings rather 
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than ghg emission reductions: According to Qi et al., “local governments show no sign of 
willingness to actually cut emissions to lower levels but rather simply to reduce the rate of 
growth in energy consumption.” (Qi et al. 2008, p394). 
Part of the measures that result in both emission reductions and cost savings do not require 
upfront investment. For example, municipal staff may be asked to switch off the light, when 
they leave their rooms, or a local authority may switch to another electricity tariff which 
provides electricity that produces fewer emissions at the same cost. Other cost saving 
mitigation measures require some upfront investment, and financial benefits are realized over 
the long-term, only. Evidence from US cities shows, that cities choose such measures, if they 
have short payback periods with typically no longer than 5 or 10 years (Kousky, Schneider 
2993, p365f.). 
Cost savings may also include costs avoided at a later stage, e.g. by “designing new buildings 
to minimize energy use rather than having to retrofit them at a later date.” (Harvey 1993, 
p16). This is especially true for cities in rapidly developing countries, with mass construction 
taking place. In China for example, more than one half of the 2015 residential and commercial 
building stock is expected to be built after 2000, and the construction process may lock in 
energy waste for the future (World Bank 2001, p7ff). Bai assumes that inefficient buildings 
built in China today will require energy-efficiency-retrofittings in the future. Therefore local 
authorities and other stakeholders in China could realize significant cost savings if building 
energy efficiency measures are installed when the infrastructure is built today, rather than 
retrofitting them at a later stage (Bai 2007, p10). 
 
Revenues 
A local government may also see a possibility to increase its revenues by implementing 
climate policies. In the city of Toronto, increased tax revenue for the city was one of the 
primary motivators for the political level (Lambright et al. 1996, p468). Local governments in 
low and middle income countries may also be able to attract external funding from 
international and bilateral aiding agencies. For mitigation activities, they may need to show 
the global benefit of their policies (Bai 2007, p9). For adaptation activities, international 
public funding may be available from bilateral donors, or through the UNFCCC’s Adaptation 
Fund. The flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol may offer opportunities for cities to 
generate revenues by implementing emission reduction projects. For example, Chinese cities 
are reported to see a market for profit in developing mitigation projects under the UNFCCC’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Qi et al. 2008, p394).2 Sippel and Michaelowa 
(2009) apply the concept of motivation and barriers as presented in this article to the CDM. 
They analyse how the CDM is taken up by local governments, and find that only about 1% of 
submitted CDM projects include municipalities as project partners. They conclude that the 
                                                 
2 Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol emission reductions from projects in developing 
countries can be financed by industrialized countries. Industrialized countries can then subtract such emission reductions 
from their Kyoto targets. As a precondition, such projects must be ‘additional’ to a business as usual scenario. 
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financial incentive for municipalities may not be strong enough to overcome barriers like 
complexity and length of the CDM project cycle. 
 
Smart growth 
Local governments have also believed that climate policies enhance ‘smart growth’. Some of 
them see direct employment opportunities, and the possibility to create jobs has been a 
motivator for energy efficiency projects (Betsill 2001, p397). More broadly, local 
governments have hoped to improve business competetiveness and enhance the local 
economy by pursuing an urban climate agenda (Fleming, Webber 2004, p763). The city 
Baoding, in Hebei Province in China believes new market opportunities are created by 
climate protection: “The mayor and his colleagues recognized that decarbonization of the 
world economy provides opportunities for the development of low-carbon industries. They 
decided to make manufacturing of renewable energy equipment a top priority of their 
industrial development.” (Qi et al. 2008, p396). 
Local adaptation activities can also be motivated by the conviction that they present a “secure 
development path” (Carmin et al. 2009, p19). In the adaptation context ‘smart growth’ is not 
primarily refering to economic development, but rather to the development of climate resilient 
settlement patterns and infrastructures. 
 
 
3.2 Political motivators 
 
Local government officials may receive political rewards for enacting climate policies – either 
because they meet external or internal pressure, or because they enhance a city’s reputation or 
act as a trend-setter. 
 
External pressure and trickle down 
External pressure on local governments to adopt climate policies may take different forms on 
a scale from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’. On the one hand, the legislative framework may directly require 
local governments to take climate action. On the other hand, pressure can also mean a process 
of norm diffusion via trickle down. Often the way external stakeholders influence a city’s 
climate governance lies somewhere inbetween the two extremes.  
Sometimes, national government action has provided an impetus for municipal governments 
to act on climate change. For example, Schreurs finds that in China “the establishment of 
local climate action strategies is largely a response to central government expectations and 
demands” (Schreurs 2008, p352). Bulkeley et al. find that the impetus from national 
government has created political space for local climate governance in South Korea and China 
in particular (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p74f.). Dhakal’s findings for Tokyo go in the same 
direction: “direct and indirect pressure from the national government’s Kyoto commitment 
[...] has created a favourable situation for local policy makers in Tokyo to act.” (Dhakal 2004, 
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p86). In the UK, local governments responded to national legislation which requires them to 
prepare strategies to improve energy efficiency or to reduce fuel poverty (Fleming, Webber, 
2004, p763). 
Bulkeley et al. 2009 describe the ‘trickle down’ of policy targets, both from national targets 
and through transnational municipal networks such as ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection 
Campaign, Climate Alliance or C40. Norm diffusion may also go from the local level via the 
national back to local governments: In China, the central government’s demand for the 
preparation of local climate action strategies is believed to have been inspired by cities’ 
climate protection activities all over the world (Schreurs 2008, p352). 
Up to now, no external requirements are reported for cities to engage in adaptation activities. 
However, trickle down may also be effective in the case of adaptation: Analysing adaptation 
in ten Asian case study cities, Tanner et al. find that national engagement in international 
climate policies and mitigation activities may well be linked to local political support for 
adaptation activities (Tanner et al. 2009, p41). 
 
Internal pressure 
Internal pressure comes from stakeholders within a city. For example, public sensitivity is 
said to have supported local climate policies in Tokyo (Dhakal 2004, p86). For the US, 
Zahran et al. (2008, p559) observe that “well-educated, politically liberal, urban communities, 
with a strong record of environmental activities, appear more supportive of policies to 
mitigate the adverse consequences of climate change.” Brody et al. identify the number of 
environmental NGOs to be an important motivator for joining the US Cities for Climate 
Protection Campaign: “[...] a county is alsmost 3 times more likely to join the CCP campaign 
for every additional environmental non-profit located within its jurisdictional boundaries.” 
(Brody et al. 2008, p37). This is somehow contradicting findings by Kousky and Schneider, 
who studied the motivation for US cities to engage in local climate action about five years 
before Brody et al.: They found citizen and NGO pressure to be a relevant motivation in only 
2 out of 23 US CCP cities interviewed (Kousky, Schneider, 2003, p361).3 
For adaptation, local governments may also be motivated by internal pressure, as there is a 
“need to protect property and residents from natural disasters” (Carmin et al. 2009, piii). It 
may be assumed that the failure to take adaptation action will sooner or later lead to pressure 
by residents who fear for their well-being and property. 
 
                                                 
3 The difference might be due to 
a) changes in the composition of CCP cities over time, with more cities being motivated by NGO pressure today, than five 
years ago, 
b) a difference between what city officials believe drove their climate activities, and the links between numbers of 
environmental NGOs and the adoption of climate policies that can be demonstrated in the statistics, 
c) a difference between participation in the CCP on the one hand, which may well be motivated by environmental NGOs (and 
which does not necessarily come with emission reduction policies), and emission reduction policies on the other hand, which 
may well be motivated not by NGO pressure but by cost savings, 
d) there may be more environmental NGOs in cities that are more likely to adopt climate policies anyway, without there 
being a causal effect of NGOs leading to stricter climate policies. 
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Trend-setting 
The desire of cities to inspire and encourage activities by either their nation states or other 
cities can be referred to as ‘trend-setting’. The ability of environmental trendsetters to 
influence agenda setting beyond their own borders is called the ‘California effect’. The 
phenomenon has been wide-spread in the US, where several federal states and numerous local 
governments started to take climate action out of frustration about the Bush administration’s 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol (Schreurs 2008, p350). A core reason for them to get 
active was to “encourage or influence more widespread federal action” (Lutsey, Sperling 
2008, p673). In Japan, local governments seem to have a tradition of acting as policy 
innovators. Accordingly, the Tokyo climate action plan explains that Tokyo must take the 
lead in light of the national government’s failure to commit to medium and long-term 
reduction targets, or to implement effective measures (Schreurs 2008, p351). 
The desire to show leadership in respect to peer cities has also been an important motivator 
for some local authorities. For example, the possibility for London to become a trend-setter in 
the C40 community is believed to have given strength to internal policy commitments to 
address climate change (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p14). 
 
Reputation 
The desire to create an attractive city environment can be a motivator for local climate action, 
too. The believe that local climate policies help to create a ‘green’ image, and may thereby 
draw people and business is reported e.g. from cities in Sweden or the US (Collier, Löfstedt, 
1997, p36; Kousky, Schneider, 2003, p367). Experience from local adaptation policies by 
early adapters shows that they, too, had the desire to enhance their reputation, “by 
demonstrating climate leadership, and the commitment to local development goals and service 
provision priorities” (Carmin et al. 2009, piii). There is a close link between the motivators 
‘reputation’ and ‘trend-setting’: Front runners in local climate action seem to be motivated 
partly by the believe, that they help improve the city’s reputation. 
 
 
3.3. Liveability 
 
Local authorities may have also implemented climate action “because it helped to improve the 
quality of life of people living and working in their areas” (Fleming, Webber 2004, p763). 
Energy-related greenhouse gas emission reduction activities may produce quality of life 
benefits such as health improvements (by better air quality or higher comfort levels in 
buildings), reduced traffic congestion, or increase of disposable income. Adaptation activities 
also affect liveability as they reduce the vulnerability of cities and their citizens to the adverse 
impacts of climate change, such as flooding or heat waves. 
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Air quality 
Local activities that produce greenhouse gas emissions may also produce other pollutants with 
direct effects on local air quality, including particulates, ozone, NOx, and SOx. Therefore, 
some policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can also reduce the production of local air 
pollutants and thereby improve local air quality as well. ICLEI’s CCP cities report improved 
air quality (and better health) as positive side-effects of local climate policies (Betsill 2001, 
p398). The need to comply with ozone standards was even a primary motivator for Chicago to 
implement a CO2 program in the early 1990s (Lambright et al. 1996, p472). The problem of 
air pollution seems to be particularly pressing in rapidly developing cities, and may serve as 
an entry point for mitigation measures: For example, the local authorities of Mexico City have 
started to “target air quality, the main local concern, and to relate it to climate change” 
(Romero Lankao 2007, p531). For Tokyo, Seoul, Shanghai and Beijing, Dhakal finds the 
integration of air pollution and greenhouse gas concerns at the local level to be an important 
policy, too (Dhakal 2004, p105). 
However, the link between a reduction in local air pollutants and a reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions is far from automatic: For example, a regulation that bans heavy polluters from 
the car fleet in a city may improve local air quality. However, banned cars would probably be 
sold to drivers outside of the city, and would thus continue to produce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Greenhouse gas emissions may even increase due to local pollution reduction 
policies. This is the case, where policies are implemented to achieve a shift from petrol use to 
diesel. Such policies reduce local air pollution, as gasoline produces fewer local pollutants 
than diesel. However, at the same time it increases greenhouse gas emisisons, as vehicles 
operated with gasoline produce more greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Traffic 
To reduce the time people spend on congested roads may be another motivator for cities to 
take action that has climate benefits. A reduction in traffic congestion may be linked to 
improved air quality, because congestions produce more local air pollutants than flowing 
traffic. A prominent example of a measure that was introduced to both reduce traffic 
congestion and improve local air quality is the London congestion charge. The measure is 
considered to be a success. However its effect in terms of CO2 emission reductions may be 
marginal (Bulkeley, Schröder 2009, p358f.). In Vienna, Austria, emission reductions in the 
transport and traffic sector are believed to come with increased pedestrian safety (Dodman 
2009, p198). Although some good examples do exist, in general, policies that address 
greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector are scarce in industrialized countries. In 
industrializing countries such policies are more common. They are often motivated by a 
desire to improve air quality and also to reduce traffic congestion (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p73). 
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Social aspects 
More efficient homes and offices reduce the energy bills of their occupants, and thus increase 
their disposable income (Betsill 2001, p398). As the buildings’ energy standards improve, 
people may also be able to afford to heat their houses more extensively. Energy-efficiency 
measures in buildings may thus increase comfort levels and help to alleviate fuel poverty 
(Fleming, Webber 2004, p769). Local governments may also take into consideration, that an 
“automobile-dependent society” disadvantages certain groups of the population (Lambright et 
al. 1996, p469), and that a decrease in car-use may come with an increase in physical activity 
and thereby improve public health (Bloomberg, Aggarwala 2008, p415f.). 
 
Other liveability 
Another benefit of local climate policies may be the reduction of the urban heat island effect. 
For example, Tokyo tries to combat both global and urban warming simultaneously in a 
comprehensive strategy (Dhakal 2004, p95). Depending on local government officials, there 
may also be very specific motivators, such as in the case of Toronto, where the mayor loved 
esthetics and thus launched a tree-planting program to protect the climate and make the city 
more beautiful (Lambright et al. 1996, p472). 
According to Bulkeley et al. local adaptation activities are often a side-benefit of activities 
that are designed to improve quality of life in a city. This includes “policies to address issues 
of water pollution, green space and urban development more broadly” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, 
p73). 
 
 
3.4 Informational: Perceived vulnerability to climate change impacts 
 
Vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change is the primary motivation for cities that 
already started to take adaptation actitivities and to integrate climate adaptation into city 
planning (Carmin et al. 2009, p19; Tanner et al. 2009, p41). Interestingly, “adaptation 
measures often get adopted only in response to specific local or regional natural disasters, 
which may or may not be climate related” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p74). For example, Roberts 
observed that political and administrative support for climate change-related work in the 
municipality of Durban improved when a series of extreme weather events during 2007 gave 
people an impression of the kind of impacts of climate change (Roberts 2008, p536). Section 
3.6 deals with the importance of triggers for the implementation of climate policies in more 
detail. 
While it is in the self-interest of cities that are affected by climate change to improve their 
climate-resilience, vulnerability to climate change impacts seems to be a motivator for local 
mitigation activities, too. In China, Western povinces are suffering more from climate change, 
because glaciers which provide their source of fresh water are melting. Facing immediate 
threats from climate change, Qi et al. find that they “have been keener to work to address 
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climate change than their eastern counterparts” (Qi et al. 2008, p394). Brody et al. present 
similar findings for cities in the US, where proximity to the coast and casualties from previous 
natural hazards such as flooding or hurricanes are strongly linked to a county’s probability to 
join ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection Campaign (Brody et al. 2008, p36). 
 
Table 2: Motivators for local climate governance 
Motivation Specification Authors 
Cost savings Bai 2007, p10; Betsill 2001, p397, 401; Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2245; 
Collier, Löfstedt 1997, p27; Dodman 2009, p198; Fleming, Webber 2004, 
p763; Harvey 1993, p16; ICLEI 2008, p6; Kern et al. 2005, p14, 52f., 78f., 
88; Kousky, Schneider 2003, p365ff, p397; Lambright et al. 1996, p468, 
474; Qi et al. 2008, p393f. 
Revenues Bai 2007, p9; Lambright et al. 1996, p468; Qi et al. 2008, p394 
Economic 
Smart growth Betsill 2001, p397f.; Carmin et al. 2009, p19; Fleming, Webber 2004, p763; 
Kousky, Schneider 2003, p367; Lambright et al. 1996, p468; Qi et al. 2008, 
p396 
External pressure 
and trickle down 
Bai 2007, p8; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p11, 74; Dhakal 2004, p86; Fleming, 
Webber 2004, p763; Kern et al. 2005, p40, 44, 94; Schreurs 2008, p352; 
Tanner et al. 2009, p41 
Internal pressure Brody et al. 2008, p37ff; Carmin et al. 2009, piii; Kousky, Schneider 2003, 
p361; Zahran et al. 2008, p559 
Reputation Carmin et al. 2009, piii; Collier, Löfstedt 1997, p36; Kousky, Schneider 
2003, p365, 367 
Political / 
cultural 
Trend-setting Bulkeley et al. 2009, p14; ICLEI 2008, p6; Lutsey, Sperling 2008, p673f.; 
Schreurs 2008, p345, 350ff 
Air quality Betsill 2001, p397f.; Dhakal 2004, p95, 105; Dodman 2009, p198; Fleming, 
Webber 2004, p769; Kousky, Schneider 2003, p367; Lambright et al. 1996, 
p472; Romero Lankao 2007, p351; Schröder, Bulkeley 2009, p358 
Traffic Betsill 2001, p397; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p73; Kousky, Schneider 2003, 
p367; Schröder, Bulkeley, 2009, p358 
Social aspects Betsill 2001, p398; Fleming, Webber 2004, p763, 769; Lambright et al. 
1996, p469 
Liveability 
Other liveability Bulkeley et al. 2009, p73; Dhakal 2004, p105; Lambright et al. 1996, p472 
Informational Perceived 
vulnerability 
Alam, Rabbani 2007, p95; Alber, Kern 2008, p2; Brody et al. 2008, p36; 
Bulkeley et al. 2009, p74; Carmin et al. 2009, p19; Qi et al. 2008, p394; 
Roberts 2008, p536; Tanner et al. 2009, p41; Zahran et al. 2008, p558 
Source: Literature review 
 
 
3.5 Importance of triggers 
 
Trigger events have provided the motivation for many local climate protection activities, both 
mitigation and adaptation (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p74). Cities have often used ‘windows of 
opportunity’ to start climate action or particular projects. City case studies are very helpful in 
revealing critical triggers. For example, in 1988, Canada experienced a long hot summer, 
when during the same period a NASA scientist declared before Congress that the greenhouse 
effect was evident. In the same year, a large international conference was held in the city of 
Toronto on the seriousness of climate change. Climate activities in Toronto started soon after, 
promoted by one individual member of the Toronto City Council, who was deeply impressed 
by the conference (Lambright et al. 1996, p466). Analysis of CCP participation in the US 
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reveals that casualties in extreme weather events are a powerful trigger that influences local 
authorities to join the CCP (Zahran et al. 2008, p558). Finally, trigger initiatives may be an 
instrument to achieve paradigm shifts, as in the context of Durban. Durban city officials have 
observed that trigger initiatives can provoke a change in the way people think, for example 
leading to “engineers thinking about social issues and environmental professionals thinking 
about economics” (ESMAP 2008, Durban representative). 
 
 
4. Challenges for local climate governance 
 
Section (3) asked what drives cities to take climate action. In contrast, this section analyses 
what hinders local climate governance. Table 3 shows the challenges identified and their 
classification as ‘economic’, ‘institutional’, ‘informational’ or ‘political/cultural’. Table 4 
further illustrates the challenges by providing exemplary quotations for each challenge. 
 
 
Table 3: Challenges for local climate governance – Overview 
Economic Informational Institutional Political / Cultural 
Tragedy of the Commons (mitigation) 
Costs 
Financial resources 
Human resources 
Accessibility of funds 
Path dependency 
Realizable benefits 
Lack of expertise 
Public interest and 
participation 
Monitoring and 
evaluation  
Little localized 
information 
Absence of national 
mandate 
Good local governance 
Internal integration and 
coordination problems 
Institutionalization 
Lack of cooperation 
Regulatory framework 
Limited control over 
utilities 
Need for policy 
entrepreneurs  
Lack of political support 
Short time horizons 
Competitive policy 
issues 
Behavioural constraints 
Source: Literature review 
 
 
Tragedy of the Commons (collective action problem) 
Local authorities are confronted with an ‘overall’ or ‘systemic’ challenge when they engage in 
mitigation policies: the benefits of local mitigation activities are non-excludable. Because the 
greenhouse effect of emissions occurs globally and independent of their place of origin, 
mitigation measures of a single municipality lead to very small benefits for everybody in the 
world. Betsill concludes that “it makes little sense for a city government to expend resources 
to control its GHG emissions, since it is not at all clear that action to control emissions in one 
particular place will have any measurable effect on the overall threat of global climate 
change” (Betsill 2001, p394). 
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Table 4: In-depth overview of challenges for local climate governance 
Challenge Exemplary quotation 
Tragedy of the Commons 
“From a rational choice perspective, it makes little sense for a city government to expend resources to control its GHG 
emissions, since it is not at all clear that action to control emissions in one particular place will have any measurable 
effect on the overall threat of global climate change.” (Betsill 2001, p394) 
Costs “[...] many cities are not willing to invest financial resources in controlling GHG emissions, since doing so often requires significant up-front costs.” (Betsill 2001, p399) 
Financial resources  “Just 4% of respondents in the survey felt they have enough resources to deliver their HECA [the UK’s Home Energy Conservation Act] strategy.” (Jones et al. 2000, p206) 
Human resources “Of the 342 respondents who stated they do not have enough resources, […] the majority (81%) stated they need finance, with 58% stating that more staff are required” (Jones et al. 2000, p206) 
Accessibility of funds 
“The ability to secure funding from external sources – from national governments, the European Union, or charitable 
foundations – has been shown to make a significant difference in the local capacity to address climate change.” 
(Bulkeley et al. 2009, p17) 
Path dependency ”Because some groups benefit from the stauts quo, they actively promote more of the same, and create obstacles to investment in alternatives.” (Suzuki et al. 2009, p28) 
Ec
on
om
ic
 
Realizable benefits “Studies instead show that climate change is seldom the main driver behind initiatives but instead a potential positive by-product of activities aimed at addressing other local problems” (Storbjörk 2007, p468) 
Lack of expertise 
“Issues such as low local human capacity to undertake this kind of planning, and the limited knowledge and 
understanding of climate issues at local and municipal level are some of the more obvious obstacles.” (Mukheibir, 
Ziervogel 2007, p156) 
Public interest and 
participation 
“[...] public sensibility to both environmental issues in general and climate change issues specifically is also important, 
in that local authorities are unlikely to get involved unless there is public and political support.” (Collier 1997, p45) 
Limited monitoring and 
evaluation 
“[...] many of the local governments do not have up-to-date emissions inventories to work with.” (Sugiyama, Takeuchi 
2008, p435) In
fo
rm
at
io
na
l 
Little localized information “Specifically, the findings suggest that adaptation efforts will be enhanced if cities […] obtain or generate information about local risks and locally-relevant adaptation measures.” (Carmin et al. 2009, piii) 
Absence of national mandate “However, in the absence of central government direction, specific ‘climate protection’ strategies have historically been rare.” (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2239) 
Good local governance 
“Good governance is a crucial determining factor of effective adaptation as the level of vulnerability to climate change, 
especially for the urban poor, is directly related to the quality of national and local government.” (Satterthwaite 2007, 
p9) 
Internal integration and 
coordination problems 
“[...] Correlating with this need to integrate energy and climate policy issues into other policy fields, new problems of 
horizontal coordination have become apparent in Berlin.” (Monstadt 2007, p339) 
Institutionalization 
“Translating political will into policy action thus requires that city governments institutionalise their efforts to control 
GHG emissions and designate responsibility for co-ordinating climate-related activities across city government.” 
(Betsill 2001, p400) 
Lack of cooperation 
Local stakeholders: “Specifically, the findings suggest that adaptation efforts will be enhanced if cities […] engage 
nongovernmental stakeholders, including NGOs, CBOs, consultants, and universities in planning and implementation.” 
(Carmin et al. 2009, piii) 
Regionally: “Successful climate policy often depends on technical infrastructure which transcends city borders.” (Alber, 
Kern 2008, p15) 
Other policy levels: “The role of national government, and of relations between local and national government, in 
shaping urban climate governance can therefore be critical.” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p15) 
Regulatory framework  “The cases of London and Los Angeles demonstrate that [...] their limitation to perform climate change policy is somewhat determined by legal frameworks at national or state levels.” (Schröder, Bulkeley 2009, p358) 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l 
Limited control over utilities “The liberalization and privatization have diminished the control of the Bundesländer and municipalities over the prices, investments and corporate policies of the utilities.” (Monstadt 2007, p327) 
Need for policy 
entrepreneurs 
“[...] in some cities the existence of an issue “champion” was essential to initiating climate policy [...]” (Kousky, 
Schneider 2003, p361) 
Lack of political support “without strong support from the decision makers climate change will not be on the local government agenda” (Fleming, Webber 2004, p763) 
Short time horizons 
“Indeed, climate change will most likely result in many damages at global, regional, and local levels, but these damages 
are less likely to make significant impacts on the local economy in the relatively short period of time that government 
officials are in office.” (Qi et al. 2008, p393) 
Competitive policy issues “Other issues take higher priority in the council.” (Allman et al. 2004, p280)  P
ol
iti
ca
l /
 C
ul
tu
ra
l 
Behavioural constraints “A new planning process that involves many planners and designers will certainly challenge the natural tendency of people – and professionals in particular – to resist change of any kind.” (Suzuki et al. 2009, p29) 
Source: Literature review 
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Local climate protection underlies the logic of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Roberts 2008, 
p536; Dhakal, Betsill 2007, p551; Gupta 2007, p132; Harrison, McIntosh Sundstrom 2007, 
p1; Lorenzoni et al 2007, p453; Davies 2005, p36; Kern et al. 2005, p11; Lambright et al. 
1996, p464). Other authors find different names for this phenomenon, such as the “scale 
issue” (Dhakal, Betsill 2007, p551), “territorial trap” (Gupta 2007, p132); “spatial and 
temporal mismatch” (McEvoy et al. 2006, p187), “free riding” (Kousky, Schneider 2003, 
p360) or “paradoxical gulf” (Droege 2002, p87ff). Following economic rationality, 
implementing measures and spending communal budgets is not sensible if others do not take 
measures as well. Local officials may argue that their cities cannot tackle climate change 
effectively but in a joint effort with all other cities and nation states in the world. In the 
absence of an adequate global climate governance framework, this results in a lack of 
mitigation measures (Gupta 2007, p132; Droege 2002, p87). 
However, Kousky and Schneider refer to the large number of cities that do have started 
climate action and argue “that at the local level, free-riding has been much less of an 
impediment than theorized. At a minimum, free riding has not prevented action for initial 
levels of abatement.” (Kousky, Schneider 2003, p360). 
 
4.1 Economic challenges 
 
Economic challenges are sometimes considered as the ‘hard facts’.Many authors believe them 
to be very influential factors for success or failure of local climate governance. To analyse the 
economic viability of measures, both costs and benefits would have to be considered, e.g. by 
doing a cost-benefit analysis. However, this type of analysis is highly complex, requires 
expert staff, and is seldomly reported from municipalities. Furthermore, many municipalities 
experience a lack of resources which manifests itself in financial constraints or insufficient 
number of staff. With limited possibilities to generate funds by themselves, or to access 
external funding, municipalities see little chance to improve their financial situation. Cost 
arguments (or more precisely the argument of sunk costs) may also serve to defend resource 
intensive pathways that were chosen in the past, and thereby hinder climate investments. 
 
Costs 
Costs are a crucial factor for explaining a lack of communal climate protection activities 
(ICLEI 2008, p6; Harrison, McIntosh Sundstrom 2007, p15). While some mitigation 
measures (especially energy saving) come with cost savings, other measures for example in 
the areas of energy-efficiency or renewable energies do involve additional costs, particularly 
upfront investment costs. Many mitigation activities (such as communal energy management) 
are taken by local authorities because they pay off soon. But even in the case of these so-
called ‘no-regret’ measures, local authorities often decide against activities that have high up-
front investment costs and long payback periods (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2007, p459). In 
particular, this applies to cities with little or decreasing financial resources, and cities in 
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developing countries are probably the most affected. (Bai 2007, p8; Rezssy et al. 2006 p233; 
Kern et al. 2005 p38). However, policy makers often have not implemented measures that do 
not require much funding, either (Dhakal 2004). 
Concerning adaptation measures, costs play an important role, too. However, adaptation is a 
more urgent issue as cities already face climate change impacts, and adaptation activities 
benefit a city directly. Therefore, the willingness to finance such activities is probably higher 
Table 5: Economic Challenges for local climate governance 
Challenges Relevance  
(country context, 
phase, 
mitigation/adaptation) 
Authors 
Costs 
- More important for 
mitigation, as 
adaptation serves 
city directly 
- Infrastructure 
backlog making 
adaptation in 
developing countries 
more difficult 
Alber, Kern 2008; Bai 2007; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p42; Dhakal 
2004; ESMAP 2009, p5; Harrison, McIntosh Sundstrom 2007; 
ICLEI 2008, p12; Kern et al. 2005; McCarney 2009, p38; Rezssy 
et al. 2006; Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2007;  
Financial 
resources 
- probably mentioned 
most often 
Alber, Kern 2008, p20; Allman et al. 2004, p280-281; Bai 2007, 
p8; Betsill 2001, p401; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p17; Bulkeley, Kern 
2006, p2241Carmin et al. 2009, p3, p8; Collier 1997, p29, 
p39Davies 2005, p28, p36; Dhakal 2004, p77; Fleming, Webber, 
2004, p770; Granberger, Elander 2007, p541; ICLEI, 2008, p12; 
Jones et al. 2000, p206; Kern et al. 2005, p3, p48; McCarney 
2009, p39; Monstadt 2007, p333-334; Mukheibir, Ziervogel 2007, 
p156; Parker, Rowlands 2007, p512; Rezssy et al. 2006, p230-235; 
Romero Lankao 2007, p530; Sugiyama, Takeuchi, 2008, p428; 
Tanner et al. 2009, p43; Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2007, p459 
Human 
resources 
-/- Allman et al. 2004, p280; Betsill 2001, p399; Bulkeley et al. 2009, 
p16, 37; Collier, Löfstedt 1997, p28; Davies 2005, p30; Demeritt, 
Langdon 2004, p333; ESMAP, Mexico City representative 2008, 
p13; ICLEI 2008, p12; Jones et al. 2000, p206; Kern et al. 2005, 
p3, p39; Roberts 2008, p535; Romero Lankao 2007, p530;  
Accessibility 
of funds 
- External funding 
more difficult to 
access for cities in 
the initial phase of 
climate action 
(learning curve) 
Bulkeley et al. 2009, p17, p37; Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2241, 
p2252; Collier 1997, p39; Davies 2005, p28; Kern et al. 2005, 
p48; Fleming, Webber, 2004, p763-765; McCarney 2009, p39; 
Monstadt 2007, p331; Parker, Rowlands 2007, p512; Sugiyama, 
Takeuchi, 2008, p428; Tanner et al. 2009, p41-43;  
Path 
dependency 
-/- Brody et al. 2008, p36; Droege 2002, p95; Suzuki et al. 2009, p28-
29; Roberts 2008, p536;  
Realizable 
benefits 
-/- Alber, Kern 2008; Betsilll 2001, p401; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p19; 
Collier 1997, p39Dhakal 2004, p81; ESMAP 2009, p5; Harrison, 
McIntosh Sundstrom 2007, p15; ICLEI 2008, p6; Kern et al. 2005, 
p52; Linstroth 2007; McEvoy et al. 2006, p186; Moser 2006, p8; 
Stobjörk 2007, p468; Ürge-Vorsatz et al 2007, p459;  
Source: Literature review 
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than the willingness to finance mitigation. Cities in developing countries that are most 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change must often start adaptation policy from a situation 
of ‘infrastructure backlog’ (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p42; ESMAP 2009, p5; McCarney 2009, 
p38). For example it is even more difficult to protect a settlement from the adverse effects of 
heavy rainfalls, where there is no sewage infrastructure in the first place. 
 
Financial resources 
Financial constraints are among the barriers mentioned most frequently. In the case of the UK 
a survey gives some empirical evidence: “Just 4% of respondents in the survey felt they have 
enough resources” (Jones et al. 2000, p206).  
A lack of financial resources can have two main reasons. Firstly, many municipalities have a 
low and instable revenue base (e.g. Carmin et al. 2009, p3; Mukheibir, Ziervogel 2007, p156; 
Romero Lankao 2007, p530). Secondly, federal transfers are often perceived to be insufficient 
(e.g. McCarney 2009, p39; Sugiyama, Takeuchi 2008, p428; Granberger, Elander 2007, 
p541). A poor municipal creditworthiness, as in Bulgaria and Macedonia, can worsen a city’s 
situation (Rezssy et al. 2006, p235). 
A survey of local governments in England and Wales shows that both successful and less 
successful cities are confronted with a lack of financial resources (Fleming, Webber, 2004, 
p770). In cities in developing countries budget constraints may often be more drastical (Bai 
2007, p8). Against this background, public-private-partnerships, fundraising and the 
combined use of different funding streams are believed to become more and more important 
for local climate action (Allman et al. 2004, p281). 
 
Human resources 
Various scholars criticize insufficient staff numbers in local authorities as a barrier to local 
climate governance. A lack of human resources often results from a lack of financial 
resources. Based on a UK-wide survey, Jones et al. provide empirical evidence for this 
causality (Jones et al. 2000, p206). As a consequence of insufficient man-power, policies and 
programmes for controlling GHG emissions are often not adequately brought into realisation 
(Betsilll 2001, p399). 
In Mexico City for example, two people struggled with the implementation of more than 20 
seperate mitigation projects (ESMAP 2008, Mexico City representative, p13). In German 
municipalities, climate protection is often one of several tasks of members of the 
Environmental Department. Usually, there is no single person in German local 
administrations who dedicates his or her time to climate action exclusively. (Kern et al. 2005, 
p39). Bulkeley et al. cite a study by Holgate, which illustrates the impact of the quantity of 
local staff. The study compares the dedicated human resources and the success of local 
climate protection activities in the cities of Cape Town and Johannesburg. Bulkeley et al. 
summarize the results as follows: “In Cape Town, the comparatively well-resourced 
municipality was able […] to make significant advances in tackling the issues while in 
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Johannesburg one officer was responsible for addressing the range of environmental 
challenges facing the city, and, at least partly as a result, the response to climate change was 
minimal.” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p16) 
The quantity of local staff dedicated to climate action is of course only one aspect. The 
expertise of this staff matters, too (Betsilll 2001, p400). 
 
Accessibility of funds 
The cost aspect is strongly interlinked with another economic challenge, namely ‘limited 
opportunity to generate/access funds’. Insufficient access to funding may slow down 
measures, lead to cancellation of projects and local programmes or affect the quality of data 
and monitoring (McCarney 2009, p39). Funds can be provided externally, usually by public 
bodies from the national to the international level. 
Where funding sources for local climate governance do exist, they should probably be 
transparent and easy to access. Fleming and Weber find that this is not the case in the United 
Kingdom: “There are a wide variety of different bodies and funding sources […]. The 
combination of different bodies, funding streams and changes in names presents a very 
complicated and confusing framework from within which local and regional energy 
management activities take place” (Fleming, Webber, 2004, p765). It is probalby due to these 
difficulties, that cities with experience in fundraising and respective capacities are more 
successful in generating funds (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p17f.). Furthermore, fundraising does 
require staff time in the first place, which then cannot be devoted to the actual implementation 
of measures (Allman et al. 2004, p281). 
Cities like Durban, South Africa or Heidelberg, Germany have found ways to access funding. 
Durban was able to attract significant international funding for its adaptation activities 
(Carmin et al. 2009, p8). Heidelberg established a revolving fund, which is fed by cost 
savings from energy efficiency projects in municipal buildings. The environmental 
department administers this fund and can decide on investments relatively independently 
(Kern et. al 2005, p51f.). Additional funds can help to build capacity and knowledge for the 
implementation of climate strategies, programmes and measures (Tanner et al. 2009, p41; 
Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2252). However, local authorities may also be successful without 
access to large amounts of funds: In the East Midlands, a region in the United Kingdom, a 
number of authorities developed comprehensive strategies with only little funding (Fleming, 
Webber 2004, p763). 
 
Path dependency 
Investments that have been made in the past to develop certain infrastructures and facilities 
can create a need to recover sunk costs and generate a return. Suzuki et al. describe this 
phenomenon, e.g. for an established centralized power supply system: “If someone proposes 
to invest in demand side management, or to meet the need for services in other ways, the 
effect is to reduce the flow of revenues below what was projected; as a consequence, the 
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existing facilities remain over-sized and may become economically unviable.” (Suzuki et al. 
2009, p28f.). Innovative approaches regarding less resource intensive energy and water 
supply or waste and waste water management can thus cause resistance by groups that make 
money from the current service infrastructure. The model of centralized supply systems was 
introduced in the 19th century, and the existence of centralized infrastructures narrows down 
the options of local decision makers (e.g. for decentralized power generation and supply)4 
(Droege 2002, p95). 
Suzuki et al. find that “public-private partnerships, if not developed properly, are another 
common example of how cities can become locked-in to technologies by entering into 
contracts that guarantee a long-term demand for services of one type.” (Suzuki et al. 2009, 
p29). In a study of climate action of cities in the US, Brody et al. discover that a greater 
percentage of people employed in carbon-intensive industries significantly decreases the odds 
of a city to adopt climate change policies (Brody et al. 2008, p37). 
Dawson et al. show that path dependency does also apply for adaptation policies: “Failure to 
consider a range of possible impacts over extended timescales can lead to undesirable ‘lock-
in’ to specific adaptation options. For example, construction of flood defence infrastructure 
can lead to intensification of floodplain development that subsequently commits floodplain 
managers to further flood defence infrastructure.” (Dawson et al. 2009) 
However, path dependency can also be observed in green policy making. The same study by 
Brody et al. finds that the existence of alternative transport increases the possiblity of a city to 
adopt climate policies (Brody et al. 2008, p36f.). Lambright et al. explained Toronto’s early 
adoption of climate protection partly with its “long tradition of environmental consciousness” 
(Lambright et al. 1996, p469). And the fact that Durban is an early adopter of adaptation 
policies can probably also be explained by its prior engagement in a variety of environmental 
programs (Carmin et al. 2009, p10). 
 
Realizable benefits 
In the light of limited local budgets, the potential of local climate action to realize economic 
benefits is a critical issue. Based on the assumption that cost-effectiveness is the ultimate 
criterion for local government spending, Betsill concludes that “It is thus important for city 
officials requesting money for climate-related projects to demonstrate the economic benefits” 
(Betsilll 2001, p401). The cost-benefit-balance of many mitigation efforts, and energy 
efficiency measures in particular, strongly depends on energy prices for fossil fuels: The 
higher the energy prices, the sooner investments in energy saving or energy efficiency 
                                                 
4 Part of the difficulty […] is that current design and planning practices for cities are rooted in patterns 
established in the 19th century, when an abundance of coal, combined with new manufacturing technologies, 
brought unprecedented increases in wealth and improvements in quality of life. By the beginning of the last 
century, millions of families in Europe and North America suddenly had access to clean water, sewage treatment, 
space heating, leighting, clean streets and public transit. This wave of societal progress and modernism was 
achieved through single-purpose, centralized, supply-oriented utilities that operated in silos, and capitalized on 
economies of scale, abundant resources, and open access to public goods like water and the atmosphere” (Suzuki 
et al. 2009, p29; see also Droege 2002, p87). 
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measures pay off. In contrast, low energy prices reduce the benefits of such mitigation 
measures. This means that low energy prices can be an important barrier to local climate 
governance (ESMAP 2009, p5). 
Besides financial savings, benefits may also include other issues such as improved air quality 
or reduced traffic congestion. Further information on possible benefits of local climate 
governance has already been provided under section (3). 
 
4.2 Informational challenges 
 
In addition to economic barriers discussed in the previous section, informational challenges 
can help to explain why local climate governance is slowed down or not fully brought into 
practice. There may sometimes be a link between informational challenges and economic 
barriers. For instance, a lack of financial resources can not only result in a lack of human 
resources, but also in insufficient qualification of staff for complex tasks, like the organization 
and coordination of climate protection activities. Informational deficits also include a lack of 
public awareness on climate change issues, and associated to this, problems to realize public 
participation in climate activities. The high complexity of the climate change issue, and little 
Table 6: Informational challenges for local climate governance 
Challenges Relevance  
(country context, 
phase, 
mitigation/adaptation) 
Authors 
Lack of 
expertise More so in developing countries, and in 
combination with 
financial constraints 
Bai 2007, p8; Beatley 2007, p40; Betsill 2001, p394-400; Collier, 
Löfstedt 1997, p26; Darier, Schüle 1999, p324; Demeritt, Langdon 
2004, p333; Dhakal 2004, p107; Kern et al. 2005, p3; Jones et al. 
2000, p206; Kallen 1996, p3; Kousky, Schneider 2003, p362; 
Mukheibir, Ziervogel 2007, p156; Storbjörk 2007, p464; Weber 
2009, p16 
Public interest 
and 
participation  
Alber, Kern 2008, p4; Allman et al. 2004, p278; Bai 2007, p7; 
Carmin et al. 2009, p20; Darier; Schüle 1999, p325; Dhakal 2005, 
p77; Diagne 2007: p555; Harrison, McIntosh Sundstrom 2007, p6; 
Löfstedt 1997, p25, 38; Lorenzoni et al 2007, p447; McCarney 
2009, p40; Moser 2006, p2, 6; Tanner et al. 2009, p41f.; Yarnal et 
al. 2003, p457, 464 
Monitoring 
and evaluation 
More so in developing 
countries, and in 
combination with 
financial constraints 
Bennett, Newborough 2001, p127; Betsill 2001, p401; Bulkeley et 
al. 2009, p83; Demeritt, Langdon 2004, p330; Dhakal 2009, p11; 
Dhakal 2004, p81; Dodman 2009, p194; Fleming, Webber, 2004, 
p766, 769; Kern et al. 2005, p80; McKinsey 2008, p6; 
Satterthwaite 2008, p546; UN-Habitat 2008 
Little localized 
information 
More so in developing 
countries, and in 
combination with 
financial constraints 
Bulkeley et al. 2009, p12f.; Bennett, Newborough 2001, p127; 
Demeritt, Langdon 2004, p330; Dhakal 2004, p77; Dodman 2009, 
p194; Fleming, Webber 2004, p766; Romero Lankao 2007, p531  
Source: Literature review 
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localized information, be it about climate change impacts or about appropriate climate 
protection strategies, can add to these problems. Regarding monitoring and evaluation of 
policies, the absence of a universally applicable methodology for local emission inventories 
and poor access to relevant data can pose further challenges. 
 
Lack of expertise 
A lack of expertise of local administration staff is found to be a central bottleneck for local 
climate governance from early studies on climate governance (e.g. Collier, Löfstedt 1997, 
p26; Kallen 1996, p3) through to recent ones (e.g. Mukheibir, Ziervogel 2007, p156; Weber 
2009, p16). Storbjörk reports that even “an experienced lack of capacity and competence” 
may be a hindrance for local officals to include climate change considerations (Storbjörk 
2007, p464). Interestingly, Kousky and Schneider find that while local administration staff 
may lack even rudimental economic skills and methods, decision makers may come to quiet 
good decisions, economically speaking (Kousky, Schneider, 2003, p366). 
Ineffective information flow in a local administration can add to the problem of limited 
expertise, especially when the cross-cutting nature of issues requires they are dealt with by 
several departments (Demeritt, Langdon 2004, p333f.). Again, the lack of expertise may be 
even more of a problem in cities in developing countries (Bai 2007, p8; Dhakal 2004, p82). 
Collier and Löfstedt suggest that external consultancy which is financed by the national 
government (in the case of Sweden in the form of local energy advisers) can be very helpful 
in order to bring knowledge into local administration and climate protection into practice 
(Collier, Löfstedt 1997, p28). 
 
Public interest and participation 
The lack of expertise is not the only challenge in the field of knowledge and information. 
Public interest and public participation matter for successful local climate governance, too. If 
public interest is not existent or limited, the transmission of climate policies into concrete 
climate action may fail (Harrison, McIntosh Sundstrom 2007, p6). Several (empirical) studies 
from Ecuador, Germany, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom,and the United States of 
America,show that public interest is often low or totally missing (Carmin et al. 2009, p20; 
Lorenzoni et al 2007, p447; Dhakal 2005, p77; Yarnal et al. 2003, p464; Darier; Schüle 1999, 
p325; Löfstedt 1997, p38). From a case study in Pennsylvania, US Yarnal et al. conclude: 
“When confronted with a list of many issues, Americans consistently place global warming at 
the bottom because they do not find it as pressing as other problems vying for their attention” 
(Yarnal et al. 2003, p457). The level of awareness and interest may differ between different 
groups and individuals, as they have different interests, habits and forms of organisation 
(Moser 2006, p2). When local officials do not care about climate change, this may be the most 
severe form of a lack in interest. Such a habit may be quite common among officials who are 
not directly and primarily involved with climate action. Alber and Kern observe that often 
“climate-related issues [are] not taken into account when climate-relevant decisions are taken 
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outside the environmental department” (Alber, Kern 2008, p4). And even where people are 
aware of the climate issue, this will not necessarily translate into consequent behavioural 
change – a phenomenon described as a ‘value-action-gap’ (Lorenzoni et al 2007, p447). More 
information on behavioural constraints follow in section 4.4 on political/cultural barriers. The 
existence of conflicting and seemingly more fundamental policy issues especially in 
developing country cities, may make it even more difficult to generate public interest for 
climate issues (Bai 2007, 7). 
Public participation can play an important role for the realization of environmental targets, in 
that it can help to mobilize and activate people (Collier, Löfstedt 1997, p25). Therefore, 
public participation can enhance climate governance in particular Mobilization and activiation 
is important for climate protection in particular (McCarney 2009, p40; Moser 2006, p6). 
Public participation can support local climate action in a number of ways. Firstly, it can help 
to build awareness for the urgency of climate issues (Allman et al. 2004, p278). Secondly, it 
cansolve problems by integrating local people and taking into account their attitudes and 
needs (Diagne 2007, p555). In order to achieve climate resilient cities in the developing 
world, Tanner et al. find the integration of socially weaker groups to be important. Since they 
often live in settlements which lack fundamental service infrastructures, they are hit hardest 
by the effects of climate change. With little public funding available for adaptation activities 
in these settlements, there is a need to develop solutions together with communities. (Tanner 
et al. 2009, p41ff). Thirdly, public participation can improve the accountability of local 
authorities, and thereby help to realize good local governance (McCarney 2009, p40). As a 
matter of fact, public participation can not guarantee successful climate governance. 
Furthermore, it can also have adverse effects on climate programs, e.g. when participation 
processes it lead to delays or to the amplification of existing conflicts (Tanner et al. 2009, 
p41). 
 
Monitoring and evaluation  
Emission inventories help to understand a city’s emission patterns, and local climate action 
plans can be based on knowledge created by emission inventories. Monitoring of the 
implementation of such action plans is a tool to evaluate the performance of climate policies 
and evaluation is a precondition to improve climate policy-making. Sugiyama and Takeuchi 
find that an understanding of regional and local anthropogenic GHG emissions and their 
sources is fundamental to the development of regional and local climate change policy. For 
Japan, they observe that “A problem for the regional and local governments, however, is that 
they often do not have very accurate information about local emissions.” (Sugiyama, 
Takeuchi, 2008, p432). And cities may not measure the impact of their climate policies, too: 
From an analysis of three German cities, who are perceived to be advanced in climate policy-
making, Kern et al. report that they do not evaluate success regularly (Kern et al. 2005, p80). 
Limited access to relevant monitoring data (e.g. data on energy consumption) may be a core 
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reason for so few cities having created localized GHG models (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p12). 
The issue of localized data will be further explored under ‘localized information’. 
Besides problems of data availability, there is also no universally applicable methodology for 
emission inventories (Dodman 2009, p194; Satterthwaite 2008, p.546). Methodologies differ, 
e.g. whether they are production or consumption based, and which sectors they include. The 
definition of these ‘technical’ parameters has a significant influence on an urban CO2-balance 
and action plans that will be based on it. The combination of limited data availability and 
methodological incertainties make emission inventories overly time consuming and costly. 
Furthermore, the variety of approaches to profile emission inventories makes a comparison of 
local climate performance very difficult. Obviously, cities may also be reluctant to evaluate 
their climate policies when they fear negative evaluation. 
While monitoring and the evaluation of policies is important, Bulkeley et al. find that “the 
emphasis on emissions inventories as the first step for climate change strategies and action 
locally may be misplaced” as “the actions required to reduce emissions of GHG locally – 
increasing energy efficiency, switching energy sources, and reducing demand for energy (in 
both buildings and for travel) – are well known” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p13). 
 
Little localized information 
Many scholars report a lack of local information, both regarding emissions, and the impacts of 
climate change. Limited access to relevant emission data is reported from cities all over the 
world, be it the UK (Fleming, Webber 2004, p769), Germany (Kern et al. 2005, p80), or 
Asian mega-cities (Dhakal 2004, p77). Bulkeley et al. conclude that “the challenges of 
gathering this sort of data at the community-wide level have been regarded as intractable by 
the majority of municipalities”, and add “Even where data is collected, much of it is not 
available in the public realm as it is held by private utility companies who regard it as 
commercially sensitive” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p12f.). The deregulation of energy supply 
companies in the 1990s has added to this problem: In the turn of deregulation, “electricity and 
gas consumption data for some local areas became less readily available” (Fleming/Webber, 
2004, p766).While access to emission data seems to be difficult in cities all over the world, 
cities in developing and industrializing countries are facing this challenge to a much higher 
degree (Dhakal 2009, p11; Dhakal 2004, p81). 
In the context of adaptation, local data on the direct and indirect effects of climate change on 
a city and individual urban areas is important. Often this data is not available, which requires 
cities to conduct their own assessments of risk and vulnerability in order to design appropriate 
adaptation measures (Satterthwaite 2007, p13ff). Although local data helps to design climate 
policies, Demeritt and Langdon do not find a simple link between accurate data and 
successful climate governance (Demeritt, Langdon 2004, p330). This shows that other aspects 
matter, too. For example, knowledge about local processes and policies may help to 
implement climate policies, too. 
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4.3 Institutional challenges 
 
Inappropriate institutional structures and mindsets are believed to be among the greatest 
challenges for the implementation of integrated economic and environmental policies on the 
local level (Suzuki et al. 2009, p28). Firstly, institutional barriers include problems which 
occur on the city level, like a failure to institutionalize local climate policy-making, a lack of 
coordination between different government departments, insufficient cooperation with local 
stakeholders or a lack of good governance. Secondly, a city’s relationship to other policy 
levels matter, including its competences under a given legal framework. The following 
provides some details on institutional barriers, and Table 7 gives an overview of institutional 
challenges. 
 
Absence of national mandate 
For local authorities in the UK, Bulkeley and Kern describe a “lack of an explicit statuatory 
duty to address climate change” (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2238). The UK is not an exemption. 
According to Alber and Kern, mandatory provisions for local climate policies are rather rare 
or fully lacking in most countries (Alber, Kern 2008, p15). There are numerous reports of 
negative effects which are believed to result from the absence of federal mandates, for 
example from the US (Betsill 2001, p394), the UK (Allmann et al. 2004, p280; Fleming, 
Webber 2004, p770; Jones et al. 2000, p209), Germany (Kern et al. 2005, p48), or South 
Africa (Carmin et al. 2009, p7). By contrast, the national government of Japan triggered local 
climate action by expressing expectations about what regional and local governments should 
do (Sugiyama, Takeuchi 2008, p426, 429). For many countries, a link between ‘external 
pressure’ as motivating local climate governance and a concrete form of external pressure, 
namely the absence of a national mandate, as hampering local climate policies, has been 
observed. 
As a matter of fact, local climate policy-making remains a voluntary task for municipalities in 
most countries. Schröder and Bulkeley explain local governments’ reluctance to implement 
regulatory climate policies by the absence of control and compliance measures taken by 
national and international levels (Schröder, Bulkeley 2009, p359). Local authorities may feel 
that the lack of a national mandate undermines their authority for climate governance. This 
may render them particularly hesitant to govern by regulation (e.g. by implementing building 
energy efficiency standards or traffic restrictions). For example, in the UK, local government 
officials are believed to neglect the mode of ‘governing by authority’ because they are 
concerned about the “consequences of going beyond the criteria stipulated in national 
planning policy statements” (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2247). 
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Table 7: Institutional challenges for local climate governance  
Challenges Relevance  
(country context, phase, 
mitigation/adaptation) 
Authors 
Absence of 
national 
mandate 
- Probably more 
important for less 
ambitious cities 
Alber, Kern 2005, p15; Betsill 2001, p394; Allman et al. 2004, p278, 280; 
Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2239, 2247; Carmin et al. 2009, p7; Collier 1997, 
p39; Dhakal 2004, p78; ESMAP, Quezon City representative 2008, p14; 
Fleming, Webber 2004, p770; Jones et al. 2000, p209; Kern et al. 2005, 
p48; Mukheibir, Ziervogel 2007, p156; Schröder, Bulkeley 2009, p359; 
Sugiyama, Takeuchi 2008, p426, 429 
Good local 
governance 
- Developing countries 
specifically 
- Adaptation more than 
mitigation 
Bulkeley et al. 2009, p36; Huq et al. 2007, p10; McCarney 2009, p38; 
Romero Lankao 2007, p530, 532; Satterthwaite 2008, p11; Tanner et al. 
2009, p41, f. 
Internal 
integration and 
coordination 
problems 
-/- Adger et al. 2005, p79; Alber, Kern 2008, p24; Allman et al. 2004, p280; 
Betsill 2001, p400; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p23, 38; Bulkeley, Kern 2006, 
p2247; Carmin et al. 2009, p11; ICLEI 2008, p12; Kern et al. 2005, p9f., 
38; McCarney 2009, p38ff; Monstadt 2007, p339; Romero Lankao 2007, 
p529f.; Suzuki et al. 2009, p28; Tanner et al. 2009, p41 
Institutionaliza
tion 
- After early phase Betsill 2001, p399f.; Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2253; Collier 1997, p53; 
Davies 2005, p27; ICLEI 2008, p12; Kern et al. 2005, p80 
- More important where 
local government has 
less resources and 
capacities 
lo
ca
l 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 Adger, et al. 2005, p79; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p16, 27; Carmin et 
al. 2009, piii; Fleming, Webber 2004, p765; Jones et al. 2000, 
p204f.; Kern et al. 2005, p10; Schröder, Bulkeley 2009, p359; 
Tanner et al. 2009, p43 
-/- 
re
gi
on
al
ly
 
Alber, Kern 2008, p15; Allman et al. 2004, p280; Betsill 2001, 
p403; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p22; ICLEI 2008, p12; McCarney 
2009, p40; Romero Lankao 2007, p529 
-/- 
O
th
er
 p
ol
ic
y 
le
ve
ls
 
Adger, et al. 2005, p79; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p38 (quote from 
Adger et al. 2005); Bulkeley et al. 2009, p15, 21f., 38f., 74; 
Davies 2005, p27; Dhakal 2004, p89; Tanner et al. 2009, p41  
Cooperation 
-/- 
C
ity
-
ne
tw
or
ks
 Alber, Kern 2008, p17ff; Bentley 2007, p5; Fay 2007, p7ff; Jones et al. 2000, p205f; Kern et al. 2005, p94 
Regulatory 
framework 
- country-specific Alber, Kern 2008, p2; Allman et al. 2004, p280; Bulkeley et al. 2009, 
p14; Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2238; Collier 1997, p43; Collier, Löfstedt, 
1997, p26; Davies 2005, p26; Dhakal 2004, p82; ESMAP 2009, p5; 
Harvey 1993, p18; Jones et al. 2000, p207; McCarney 2009, p38; Qi et al. 
2008, p391; Schreurs 2008, p353; Schröder, Bulkeley 2009, p358; 
Sugiyama, Takeuchi, 2008, p425ff;  
Limited control 
over utilities 
- Mitigation probably 
more than adaptation 
Alber, Kern 2008, p10; Betsill 2001, p403; Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2242ff; 
Collier 1997, p43; Collier, Löfstedt 1997, p29; Jones et al. 2000, p209; 
Kallen 1996, p3; Kern et al. 2005, p16; McCarney 2009, p38; Monstadt 
2007, p327ff; Romero Lankao 2007, p531; Schröder, Bulkeley 2009, 
p359; Sperling 2008, p15; Weimer-Jehle et al. 2001, p61ff 
Source: Literature review 
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Overall, scholars agree that the absence of a national mandate presents a great challenge for 
local governments affected. Often climate change is not a priority for these local authorities. 
This is particularly true for mitigation activities, as they are not automatically in the self-
interest of cities. But adaptation planning, too, may be constrained where there are no national 
legislative frameworks in place that require local authorities to take action (Mukheibir, 
Ziervogel 2007, p156). 
 
Good local governance 
Local governments may play an important role in providing key local infrastructures e.g. for 
water, sanitation, drainage or waste collection. They are often responsible for fire, other 
emergency services and some health care facilities, as well. And at least in theory they play a 
key role in urban planning. The quality of local governance in these areas has very large 
implications for the adaptive capacity of a city, particularly in urban areas of low- and middle-
income nations (Satterthwaite 2007, p11). For example, substantial lacks in infrastructure 
provision and the existence of large informal housing developments add to the vulnerability of 
communities, and “often reflect local governments that are unrepresentative, unaccountable 
and anti-poor” (Satterthwaite 2007, p11). For the case of Mexico, the legal regime seems to 
allow corruption and “weak or deviated enforcement of carbon-relevant measures” (Romero 
Lankao 2007, p530). In addition, high turnover rates in local government staff lead to 
institutional instability and make technical trainings ineffective. 
In the context of good local climate governance, the literature highlights the importance of 
transparency, accountability, and participation. McCarney finds citizens’ access to 
information and a relationship of accountability between local governments and their citizens 
to be essential (McCarney 2009, p40). Tanner et al. agree that accountability mechanisms are 
crucial, along with participation in urban planning. As climate change impacts may lead to the 
emergence of new problems and increased frequency and/or severity of disasters, they further 
argue for “flexible agencies and management systems, suited to responding to and 
anticipating these surprises” (Tanner et al. 2009, p41f.). 
The lack of good local governance also includes ‘inadequate planning and design methods’. 
Satterthwaite notes that the application of imported models of urban planning and government 
in cities of the global South is often not appropriate in the light of local context and 
possibilities (Satterthwaite 2007, p12). The World Bank’s Energy Efficient Cities Initiative 
identified inadequate planning and design methods as policy and regulatory barriers to energy 
efficiency in cities in low and middle income cities (ESMAP 2009, p5). 
 
Internal integration and coordination problems 
Climate protection is a complex and multi-disciplinary subject. It requires cooperation 
between city officials occupied with issues such as waste management, transportation, urban 
planning, utilities and air quality. However, local government departments usually have 
seperate budgets, timelines and goals (Suzuki et al. 2009, p28) and local officials tend to 
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“focus on their narrow tasks, often with little interaction with individuals in other divisions or 
departments” (Betsill 2000, p400). According to Alber and Kern, the fact that competences 
for climate policies are often located at the environmental department, may increase 
integration and coordination problems. This is the case where environmental departments are 
marginalized within municipal bureaucracies, and therefore lack the competences to 
coordinate and implement comprehensive climate policies (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p23). 
 
In short, the cross-cutting nature of climate change does not fit the way local governments 
organize themselves. Furthermore, being a new issue area, climate change is often surrounded 
by institutional ambiguity (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2251). This presents a challenge for local 
climate governance present in local authorities all over the world. Scholars have analysed how 
cities try to meet this challenge. Romero Lankao shows that Mexico City has set up a carbon-
relevant coordinating commission – a measure which has not resulted in much coordination so 
far (Romero Lankao 2007, p529). Kern et al. recommend better intergovernmental integration 
for German local authorities. They highlight the importance of political support from top 
government officials for such integration efforts (Kern et al. 2005, p9). 
While the aforementioned authors draw conclusions from local mitigation policies, Bulkeley 
et al. report that “the implementation of adaptation measures is likely to encounter greater 
institutional complexity than is the case even for climate mitigation” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, 
p38). Successful adaptation policies may therefore require even more integration and 
coordination efforts than mitigation policies. Informal networks between individuals from 
different municipal departments may be helpful to achieve this, like in the cases of Durban 
and Quito, where such networks provided a basis for adaptation planning (Carmin et al. 2009, 
p11). 
 
Institutionalization 
Betsill finds that in US cities, “There is often no institutional home for climate change policy 
making” (Betsill 2001, p399). Davies presents similar findings from Ireland (Davies 2005, 
p27). A situation, where responsibilities for climate-related activities are not defined properly, 
will not produce effective climate activities. Institutionalization is essential in order to 
overcome “party politics and political timetables” as well as “resistance and inertia within the 
administration” (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2253). Furthermore, institutionalization helps to 
survive the loss of particular committed individuals, which play an important role in initiating 
local climate policy-making. For all these reasons, ICLEI supports member cities in 
“developing the policy, staff and funding structures” that support their internal commitment to 
climate change action (ICLEI 2008, p12). 
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Lack of cooperation 
Æ  with local stakeholders 
Many organisations and 
individuals are involved in the 
implementation of greenhouse 
gas reduction strategies on the 
local level. Therefore, Fleming 
and Webber ask for a 
partnership approach (Fleming, 
Webber 2004, p765). Local 
stakeholders may be important 
to “build a local support base 
and develop context-specific 
solutions” (Schröder, Bulkeley 
2009, p359). This experience 
was made in cities in many 
countries, e.g. in Germany, 
Mexico, South Africa, the UK, 
or the US. Bulkeley et al. 2009 
conclude that “partnerships 
between state and non-state 
actors have proved to be 
critical in building the 
resources and capacities of 
municipal governments to address climate change” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p27). This applies to 
both, mitigation and adaptation activities. Findings by Carmin et al. on adaptation in Quito 
and Durban suggest that “adaptation efforts will be enhanced if cities […] engage 
nongovernmental stakeholders, including NGOs, CBOs, consultants, and universities in 
planning and implementation.” (Carmin et al. 2009, piii) Table 8 gives an overview of local 
stakeholders as presented in the literature. 
 
Lack of cooperation 
Æ  regional cooperation 
There is often a spatial mismatch between institutional responsibilities and jurisdictional 
boundaries of a city on the one hand, and the required greenhouse gas reduction or adaptation 
activities on the other hand. Often, formal city boundaries seem to be too narrow, be it for 
land, transport and energy policies, that aim at emission reductions, or for improved 
infrastructure and emergency preparedness to enhance climate-resilience in a city. McCarney 
describes a horizontal fragmentation of government structures as “multiple jurisdictional and 
electoral boundaries [...] span the territories of vast metropolitan areas” (McCarney 2009, 
Table 8: Local stakeholders with relevance for climate 
protection activities (in alphabetical order) 
Mitigation Adaptation 
- Academic institutions, scientists 
- Banks 
- Building societies 
- Business sector and 
organizations 
- Charities  
- Civil society groups (incl. 
environmental and transport 
groups, political parties, 
religious groups, trade unions) 
- Consumer counseling 
- Energy efficiency professionals 
(architects, chimney sweepers, 
heating installers, construction 
industry)  
- Energy suppliers 
- Housing associations 
- Media 
- Public facilities 
- Schools, further education 
- Transport utilities 
- Waste, wastewater utilities 
- Water suppliers 
- Building and planning 
professionals (e.g. architects, 
building engineers, civil 
engineers, city planners) 
- Community-based groups 
- Consultants 
- Firms 
- Health facilities 
- Meteorologists 
- NGOs, civil society 
- Police, Fire brigade, 
Emergency services 
- Research organisations / 
universities 
- Tourism industry 
- Water, waste water, waste 
management utilities 
Source: Carmin et al. 2009, piii; Fischer, Kallen 1997, p82; Fleming, 
Webber 2004, p765; Jones et al. 2000, p205; Kern et al. 2005, p10; 
Schröder, Bulkeley 2009, p359; Tanner et al. 2009, p43 
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p40). Regional fragmentation of governance arrangements seems to be particularly strong in 
rapidly growing cities, mostly located in industrializing and developing countries. In these 
cities traditional city limits and governing structures are becoming increasingly outdated 
(McCarney 2009, p38f.). Mexico City, for example, is managed “by diverse federal, state and 
local tiers of government”, so that the boundaries and functioning do not fit (Romero Lankao 
2007, p259). Regional fragmentation may also lead to “competition between local authorities 
within one metro-region to attract developers and investors” (Alber, Kern 2008, p16). Such a 
situation may result in a race-to-the-bottom concerning environmental standards. 
Dodman and Satterthwaite describe another phenomenon: Many activities that serve a city are 
producing greenhouse gases outside the jurisdiction of municipal boundaries (e.g. electricity 
production and provision, food production or refinery of transport fuels) – and cities may be 
completely unable to alter the practices of these services (Dodman 2009, p194ff; Satterthwaite 
2009, p541ff). 
 
Lack of cooperation 
Æ  with other policy levels 
The need for cooperation also includes other policy levels. Bulkeley et al. point out that key 
sectors for adaptation, “such as coastal management and agriculture – are rarely within the 
direct remit of city governments” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p38f.). They assume that national 
adaptation strategies which proactively engage with local issues can foster adaptation within 
municipalities. Tanner et al. further find that local adaptation benefits from situations, “where 
national, state and city ruling parties can work together quickly and effectively to implement 
policies and programs” (Tanner et al. 2009, p41). For mitigation, such cooperation seems 
equally important, and particularly so, where cities’ climate protection activities are 
voluntary. For example, in China the national government designs policies to stimulate 
private vehicle use, which make it very difficult for local governments to design effective 
climate policies in the transport sector (Dhakal 2004, p89). 
Cooperation may also include other cities, e.g. by city-networking. There is a variety of city 
networks on climate protection, like ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection Campaign, Climate 
Alliance, C40 Cities, Energie Cités or the Covenant of Mayors. There may be a link between 
a local government’s city networking activities and the success of local climate governance. 
For example, membership to more than one city-network on climate change was found to be 
an indicator of successful urban climate governance in Germany (Kern et al. 2005, p94). In 
the UK, during implementation of the Home Energy Conservation Act, some authorities 
would liaise with other authorities, to share experiences and best practice and even work 
together. Interestingly, “the analysis showed that those liaising with more than 10 other 
authorities produced significantly better reports than those liaising with none.” (Jones et al. 
2000, p205f.). 
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Regulatory framework 
The degree to which a city can implement local climate policies also depends on “a city’s 
competences and authority to regulate climate-relevant issue areas” (Alber, Kern 2008, p2). 
City governments may only have “limited power and responsibility over key public services, 
including planning, housing, roads and transit, water, land-use, drainage, waste management 
and building standards” (McCarney 2009, p38). Furthermore they are usually not able to act 
“in such important areas as the establishment of energy and eco taxes, the establishment of 
fuel efficiency standards, and the formulation of broad energy policies” (Schreurs 2008, 
p353). 
The level of local competences in climate-relevant issue areas may vary from country to 
country (Collier, Löfstedt 1997, p26). The World Bank’s ‘Energy Efficient Cities Initiative’ in 
low and middle income countries identified “limited autonomy vis-à-vis national/state bodies” 
as a policy and regulatory barrier to energy efficiency in cities (ESMAP 2009, p5). In their 
survey of cities’ climate policies in the UK, Allman et al. observe “insufficient local authority 
powers” as a barrier (Allman et al. 2004, p280). Cities in Ireland are reported to lack 
significant tax-raising powers, and are therefore limited in their ability to innovate in policy 
development and implementation (Davies 2005, p26). In Japan, local governments’ 
competences to independently formulate climate change, energy or traffic policies are limited, 
too. They are more or less restricted to the ‘enabling’ mode of governance. This did not 
change with the national ‘Global Warming Law’: while the new law sets an expectation for 
local climate policies, it does not provide the required legal competences (Sugiyama, 
Takeuchi, 2008, p425, 428). 
 
Limited control over utilities 
Traditionally, and particularly in industrialized countries, local governments have often 
provided certain services for their population, among them energy supply, public transport, 
housing, and water, waste water and waste management. These sectors hold a substantial 
potential for local climate protection activities. Municipalities that have control over these 
issues, “can have significant capacity to address climate change that other local authorities 
lack” (Bulkeley et al. 2009, p15). However, in Europe, pressure of market-liberalisation has 
led municipalities to “withdraw from the provision of public utilities, particularly in relation 
to energy and transport” (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2242). This process is known as ‘new public 
management’ in the UK. It follows the concept of liberalisation and privatisation that coined 
political thinking around the world from the early 1990s onwards. With limited control over 
their utilities, local governments have little control “over the prices, investments and 
corporate policies of the utilities” (Monstadt 2007, p327). Take energy provision as an 
example, where investment and pricing can induce a shift to decentralized and renewable 
energy infrastructures (Collier 1997, p43). Furthermore, where the liberalisation of energy 
markets has come with a reduction in energy prices (which is not always the case), this may 
 34 
help to alleviate fuel poverty on the hand, and lead to an increase in carbon emssions as low 
energy prices reduce consumer interest in energy efficiency (Jones et al. 2000, p208f.). 
Scholars report that limited control over key public services is a barrier for climate policies in 
cities all over the world. For the US, Betsill observes that limited control over local utilities 
renders cities unable to implement policies and measures directed at energy conservation or 
fuel switching (Betsill 2001, p403). In Germany “numerous municipal utilities have been, or 
are being, privatized” (Monstadt 2007, p327). In the course of their privatization, “demand-
side management programmes, which where popular among local utilities, have been almost 
completely phased out” (Alber, Kern 2008, p9). It is therefore not surprising, that those 
German municipalities that still own their utilities are reported to be more successful in the 
field of climate change policy (Kern et al. 2005, p16; Weimer-Jehle et al. 2001, p4). In 
Mexico city public transportation was deregulated. Romero Lankao finds that this contributed 
to a growth in carbon emissions, as it resulted in a growth in car ownership and use, a vacuum 
in the provision of high-capacity modes of transportation and a modal shift from Metro and 
buses to minibuses (Romero Lankao 2007, p531). 
 
 
4.4 Political and cultural challenges 
 
There is another kind of challenges for local climate policy, that may be categorized as 
‘political’ or ‘cultural’. Among them are support for a local climate agenda, be it from chief 
politicians or from less prominent but highly motivated policy entrepreneurs in the 
administration or the city council. The short-term perspective of decision-makers and the 
existence of a broad range of competitive policy issues may both lead local authorities to set 
aside the climate change issue. Effective local climate governance would also include policies 
that address target groups on the local level, such as homeowners or businesses. Behaviour 
constraints like human reluctance to change and the profit-making culture of local businesses 
may lead these target groups to offer resistance to local climate policies. Table 9 provides an 
overview of political and cultural challenges. 
 
Need for policy entrepreneurs 
A broad range of case studies report the existence of a more or less influential proponent for 
the local climate agenda. It seems that committed personalities from the political sphere, in 
the administration, or in the local energy company can influence the level of local 
involvement significanlty (Collier 1997, p54). Policy entrepreneurs are particularly important 
for the process of persuasion within a municipality and can give an impetus for local climate 
governance (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2252). For 10 out of 23 cities from the ICLEI CCP 
program in the US, Kousky and Schneider found the existence of such an “issue champion” 
was essential to initiating climate policy (Kousky, Schneider 2003, p361). Policy 
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entrepreneurs or issue champions seem to be particularly important in the early stage of local 
climate governance. Longterm effectiveness of local climate protection may however largely 
depend on whether an issue champion is successful in building a broader institutional capacity 
for climate policies – not least in order to make climate activities survive the loss of particular 
individiuals like him or herself (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2253; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p14). 
Policy entrepreneurs seem to be important in cities all over the world, and for both mitigation 
and adaptation. For local authorities in the UK and Sweden, Collier and Löfstedt report a link 
between a high level of involvement in climate protection on the one hand and the existence 
of one or two particularly committed individuals in the municipality on the other hand 
(Collier, Löfstedt 1997, p36). In Toronto, Canada, it was also an issue champion who first put 
climate change on the political agenda. Interestingly, he is believed to have been especially 
Table 9: Relevance of political and cultural challenges for local climate governance 
Challenges 
Relevance 
Country context, Phase, 
Relevance 
Authors 
Need for policy 
entrepreneurs 
Especially relevant for early 
phase of local climate 
governance 
Betsill 2001, p399; Bulkeley et al. 2009, p14, 36; 
Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2252f.; Carmin et al. 2009, 
p8, 19, 22; Collier 1997, p54; Collier, Löfstedt 
1997, p36; Kousky, Schneider 2003, p361; 
Lambright et al. 1996, p469ff; McCarney 2009, 
p39; Qi et al. 2008, p396; Sugiyama, Takeuchi 
2008, p425 
Lack of political support  Alber, Kern 2008, p12; Allmann et al. 2004, p280; 
Betsill 2001, p398; Bulkeley, Kern 2006, 2240, 
2247; Carmin et al. 2009, p22; Darier, Schüle 
1999, p324; ESMAP 2008, p12; Fleming, Webber 
2004, p763; Jones et al. 2000, p206f.; Kern et al. 
2005, p3, 42, 89ff; Roberts 2008, p536; Schreurs 
2008, p352; Tanner et al. 2009, p41 
Short time horizons  ESMAP 2008, p12; ESMAP 2009, p5; McEvoy 
2006, p5, p187; Mukheibir, Ziervogel, 2007, p156; 
Qi et al. 2008, p384, 393; Romero Lankao 2007, 
p530) 
Competitive policy issues Even more so in developing 
countries, and where 
municipal budgets are 
decreasing or already small 
Alber, Kern 2008, p2, 24; Allman et al. 2004, 
p280; Bai 2007, p3, 7; Betsill 2001, p400f.; 
Bulkeley et al. 2009, p18, 33; Carmin et al. 2009, 
p11; Dhakal 2004, p85; ESMAP 2008, p11; 
Granberg, Elander 2007, p546; Huq et al. 2007, 
p13; Jones et al. 2000, p209; Kern et al. 2005, p88; 
Monstadt 2007, p339; Mukheibir, Ziervogel, 2007, 
p156 ; Roberts 2008, p523; Schreurs 2008, p351; 
Storbjörk 2007, p462; Suzuki et al. 2009, p28 
Behavioural constraints  Allman et al. 2004, p280; Betsill 2001, p401; 
Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2247; Collier, Löfstedt 
1997, p32; Darier, Schüle 1999, p323; Dhakal 
2004, p87; Harrison, McIntosch Sundstrom 2007, 
p7f.; Harvey 1993, p21; Kern et al. 2005, p3, 11f.; 
Lorenzoni et al. 2007, p447; Moser 2006, p7; 
Suzuki et al. 2009, p29; Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2007, 
p459 
Source: Literature Review 
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credible because he was from the conservative side of the ideological spectrum (Lambright et 
al. 1996, p469). For local adaptation policy-making, Carmin et al. identify a “public official as 
champion” for the city of Quito in Peru. For the city of Durban in South Africa, they find a 
“government employee as champion”, “who was committed to the cause and willing to 
explore unfamiliar terrain” (Carmin et al. 2009, p19, p8).  
Of course, the issue champion starting the process of local climate policy-making may also be 
the mayor him- or herself. In that case, the policy entrepreneur is also able to lend political 
support to the climate agenda (see next section). Japanese cities with such “activist” mayors 
and governors have been particularly likely to make global warming one of their top political 
priorities (Sugiyama, Takeuchi 2008, p425). The Chinese city of Baoding in Hebei Province 
has implemented policies to transform production and consumption in the city to a low-carbon 
system – a process which Qi et al. attribute to the mayor’s vision and leadership (Qi et al. 
2008, p396). 
 
Lack of political support 
Where the issue champion is not incidentally also the mayor or another high-ranking 
politician, the support offered by issue champions may have to be complemented by 
equivalent political champions (e.g. Roberts 2008, p536). From experience with local 
authorities’ mitigation policies in the UK, Fleming and Webber conclude that “without strong 
support from the decision makers climate change will not be on the local government agenda” 
(Fleming, Webber 2004, p763). Key politicians can support climate policies by helping to 
secure project funding, raising awareness, or establishing a political vision for climate 
protection throughout all departments and bodies of a local authority (Jones et al. 2000, 
p206f.; Kern et al. 2005, p89).  
Political support is probably particularly important when a city wants to use its competences 
of regulation for climate governance, or where highly debated climate protection policies are 
to be implemented (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2247; Kern et al. 2005, p91). Political support for 
local climate policies may depend on party politics, like in Germany. German local authorities 
experienced more difficulties in implementing climate policies, when the liberal conservative 
party (Christian Democratic Union) and the liberal party (Free Democratic Party) were in 
power, than under the rule of the social democratic party (Social Democratic Party of 
Germany) and the green party (Alliance ‘90/the Greens) (Kern et al. 2005, p42). The support 
of mayors is reported to be important in cities in China, Japan or Ukraine (ESMAP 2008, p12, 
Lviv city representative; Qi et al. 2008, p396; Sugiyama, Takeuchi 2008, p425). 
For adaptation, political support is important, too. Carmin et al. find in their two case studies 
of early adapters Durban and Quito, that “The support of public officials [...] determined 
whether adaptation was viewed as a legitimate issue and affected the rate at which planning 
and implementation took place” (Carmin et al. 2009, p22). This is confirmed by Tanner et al. 
who observe that the integration of adaptation issues into development plans is i.a. influenced 
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by “levels of motivation among elected representatives and government departments” (Tanner 
et al. 2009, p41). 
 
Short time horizons 
Climate change is a long-term phenomenon. Because of the long residence periods of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, results of climate change mitigation implemented today 
will only be seen in the long-term. And while climate change already affects us today, some 
significant changes to our climate will occur in the distant future of 2050 or even after 2100 
(IPCC 2007, p14ff). McEvoy finds that these time scales are seldom in the vision of English 
local policy-makers. Even planning strategies which shall consider long-term spatial planning 
issues are limited to forward horizons of only 15-20 years (McEvoy 2007, p5). In Cape Town, 
South Africa, adaptation planning “projects that don’t fit into the short political life of 
decision makers are not implemented.” (Mukheibir, Ziervogel 2007, p156) 
The World Bank’s Energy Efficient Cities Initiative under the Energy Sector Management 
Assistance Program identifies election cycles as an underlying cause for short-term thinking 
of decision makers (ESMAP 2009, p5). The problem may increase, where local politicians are 
restricted to serve only one election period. For example, in Mexico City, governors and the 
president serve for a single six-year term, and municipal presidents and ‘delegados’ for a 
single three-year period – a situation which is believed to prevent longterm accountability in 
policy-making (Romero Lankao 2007, p530). 
In China, there are no election cycles. However, top political leaders tend to be concerned 
about their career advancement, too. They used to be evaluated for their promotion of 
economic development. Climate change was not an issue to them as mitigation actions were 
believed to slow down economic growth and as the damages caused by climate change on 
global, regional and local levels “are less likely to make significant impacts on the local 
economy in the relatively short period of time that government officials are in office” (Qi et 
al. 2008, p393). Lately, however, climate change has become a factor in the performance 
evaluation system and hence motivates local politicians to develop local climate strategies.5  
Moreover, the temporal disconnect between climate protection measures and reduced climate 
change impacts makes it difficult for people to understand and accept political decisions. In 
contrast, the effects of adaptation policies are immediate. Therefore they may be more 
attractive for decision-makers (McEvoy et al. 2006, p187). 
 
Competitive policy issues 
Climate protection has become an issue for an increasing number of local authorities. 
However, where climate protection is on a city’s agenda, it has to compete with key areas of 
urban governance, such as social issues, public health, economic growth and a city’s thrive for 
                                                 
5 The nationwide 20% reduction target in energy intensity from 2005 to 2010 has been hierarchically handed down to local 
government levels, and government officials are evaluated based on their progress towards reaching the target (Qi et al. 2008, 
p384). 
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competitiveness (Alber, Kern 2008, p24). Bai is probably right, when he states that “for the 
majority of cities in the world, addressing global change does not top their agenda.” (Bai 
2007, p3). He illustrates the specific problems of developing country cities: “Why bother with 
the global issue, when people are dying from local environmental problems such as bad 
sanitation and pollution? How do we justify it?” (Bai 2007, p7). As billions of people have 
difficulty meeting their food needs and lack basic services, cities face immediate and severe 
challenges (Huq et al. 2007, p13). These challenges are aggravated by rapid urbanization. 
Furthermore, the resources of cities in developing countries are often very limited: Many 
cities face significant administrative, technical and financial capacity constraints. Last but not 
least, historic responsibility for climate change is low in developing country cities (Bulkeley 
et al. 2009, p18). 
Durban, South Africa, has 43% unemployed, an estimated housing backlog of 190,000 units, 
and high levels of HIV/Aids infection. Therefore it is “hardly surprising that climate change 
(an issue that appears more remote and global in nature) has remained – until relatively 
recently – a low priority on the municipality’s agenda” (Roberts 2008, p523). Or take the city 
of Quezon in the Philippines, where immediate needs, such as employment creation, slum 
eradication and safety, have higher priority than global environmental issues such as climate 
change, too (ESMAP 2008, p11, Quezon City representative). Chinese local governments’ 
priorities were dominated by economic growth concerns, which made even the 
implementation of existing environmental laws challenging (Schreurs 2008, p351). With day-
to-day and sector-to-sector problems piled on their front counter, city administrators in 
developing countries find no time to take on long-term plans or cross-cutting agendas which 
would be necessary for a transformation to energy efficient cities (Suzuki et al. 2009, p28). 
In Cape Town, South Africa, adaptation planning is challenging, too: Often medium- to long-
term planning is sidelined because of limited financial resources and competing priorities 
(Mukheibier, Ziervogel, 2007, p156). Areas of conflict may also arise between adaptation and 
economic development, e.g. where low lying coastal areas shall be developed in order to 
attract tourism – irrespective of sea level rise and its impacts (Carmin et al. 2009, p11). 
While the existence of competitive policy issues is obvious in low and middle income 
countries, they are a challenge in cities in industrialized countries, as well. Dhakal finds that 
most cities in Japan suffer from local air pollution through particulate matter and nitrogen 
oxide emissions. As a consequence, it is not greenhouse gas problems, but control of diesel 
vehicles that is of highest priority in Tokyo, with the risk that policies to control diesel 
vehicles may lead to an increase of other emissions, e.g. by promoting a shift of drivers from 
diesel to less CO2-efficient gasoline vehicles (Dhakal 2004, p85). In Sweden, Granberg and 
Elander observed a conflict between municipal ambitions to become “a node in a web of ever 
increasing land transport, on one hand, and a city tending towards ecologically sustainable 
transport on the other” (Granberg, Elander 2007, p546). And Storbjörk finds that Swedish 
cities’ adaptation activities come after core issues such as schools, eldercare, medical services 
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(Storbjörk 2007, p462). This is the case in Germany, too. According to German jurisdiction, 
climate protection is a ‘voluntary’ task for local authorities. It automatically ranks behind 
‘mandatory’ tasks such as urban land-use planning, waste water management, or building and 
maintenance of kindergartens and schools. And when it comes to the voluntary tasks, there is 
also a range of other voluntary tasks, that are given priority by many German cities, be it 
theatres, libraries or sport facilities (Kern et al. 2005, p88). For the city of Berlin, Germany, 
Monstadt further observed a competition between economic, financial, housing and building 
policy – instead of an integrated approach to tackle climate and energy issues (Monstadt 2007, 
p339). The competition between policy issues ususally increases, where the available budget 
of a city is small or decreases. This has been shown above for cities in developing countries. 
However, it also applies to cities in industrialized countries. For example, experience from the 
US shows, that when there is a budget shortfall, environemtnal programs, which are seen as 
luxury expenditures, are often hit first (Betsill 2001, p400). 
 
Behavioural constraints 
Local climate governance often addresses local stakeholders, like citizens, businesses and 
community groups (Allman et al. 2004, p280). Behavioural constraints may cause disinterest 
or resistance by these groups against local climate policies. Such resistance is not limited to a 
particular issue: Ürge-Vorsatz et al. report that behavioural constraints of both individuals and 
companies, hinder the adoption of energy-efficiency technologies and practices (Ürge-Vorsatz 
et al. 2007, p459). Beatley experienced scepticism towards the quality of solar energy home 
design (Beatley 2006, p37), and Betsill finds that city budget officials in the US have been 
sceptical towards performance contracting (Betsill 2001, p401). 
Consumer behaviour may be one of the problems, local authorities face. As consumers people 
take decisions in their everyday life that have significant greenhouse gas impacts, e.g. by their 
choice of food, homes and mode of transport. Consumer behaviour may be difficult to 
influence for local authorities. Lorenzoni et al. find that even where public awareness and 
concern are widespread there is limited behavioural response to climate change – a situation 
they call an ‘attitude-behaviour’ or ‘value-action’ gap (Lorenzoni et al. 2007, p447). This may 
be due to a natural tendency of people to resist change. Suzuki et al. call this phenomenon 
“human inertia” (Suzuki et al. 2009, p29). Furthermore, the motivation for our behaviours 
may be manifold. Most of them “are convenient and easy, they do not hurt most of us too 
badly in the pocket book, and […] they give us a particular social status and identity” (Moser 
2006, p7). Moser concludes that these underlying motivations must be kept in mind when 
trying to introduce new habits.  
Some examples shall illustrate the challenge: In the city of Uppsala, Sweden, local officials 
perceived the conservative culture of the municipal government as the biggest constraint to 
local climate policies, as it has prevented more innovative ideas from being realized (Collier, 
Löfstedt 1997, p32). In the UK, the conservative culture of the construction industry may 
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present a particular challenge for local climate governance (Bulkeley, Kern 2006, p2247). 
Kern et al. observe that local climate protection projects often fail in German cities because 
they do not succeed in changing consumer behaviour. Furthermore, the conservative culture 
makes regulatory policies particularly difficult to implement. Politicians fear they are difficult 
to legitimate and may result in resistance by citizens (Kern et al. 2005, p3, 11f.). 
Several scholars report that engineers may be reluctant to change, too. World Bank experience 
from the Eco2City Program is that “If conservative engineers are hired to consider a type of 
system they have never previously designed, they will invariably condemn the idea. While 
conservative engineers are in most respects the best kind to have, the process of preliminary 
engineering, or concept design, requires a much more open and innovative mindset […]” 
(Suzuki et al. 2009, p29). 
Specific schemes may be particularly likely to meet local resistance. Yarnal et al. find that in 
the US, the “public does not support programmes that jeopardise automobile use or domestic 
heating and cooling” (Yarnal et al. 2003, p457). Private car use is a ‘sacred cow’ in Germany, 
too. Local climate policies that touch upon the free use of private automobiles are highly 
debated and often meet local resistance. This makes politicians reluctant to implement climate 
policies that address the transport secto. (Kern et al. 2005, p40, 81). 
The profit-seeking culture of the corporate sector is highlighted by Darier and Schüle as a 
barrier to local climate governance in Manchester, UK and Frankfurt, Germany (Darier, 
Schüle 1999, p323). It may hinder local climate policies that depend on the corporate social 
responsibility of companies. 
 
 
5. Discussion  
The literature presents a variety of challenges for local climate governance. Interestingly, only 
a very limited number of studies do evaluate the relevance of the challenges identified in great 
detail. The studies by Allmann et al. 2004 and Jones et al. 2001 present exemptions in that 
they provide quantitative information on specific barriers in their respective surveys on 
communal climate and energy action in the UK (Allmann et al. 2004, p. 280; Jones et al. 
2001, p207). The frequency of citations of certain motivators and challenges in the literature 
analysed may provide some indication of their relevance. Although table 2 and tables 6 to 9 
do not include every single notion of a challenge in the literature analysed, they may allow for 
some conclusions. Table 2 shows that ‘cost savings’, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘air quality’ are 
among the key motivators for local climate governance. From tables 6 to 9 we conclude that 
‘financial resources’, ‘cooperation’, and ‘competitive policy issues’ are among the most 
important challenges for local climate policy-making. However, this does not differentiate 
between mitigation and adaptation, accurately. 
In an effort to gather more information on the relevance of the challenges and motivators, and 
to also include the difference between adaptation and mitigation, an analysis of the abstracts 
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of the literature used was done. This was based on the assumption, that authors, while 
elaborating on a range of challenges in the body of their articles, would name only the 
seemingly most important ones in their abstracts. In order to differentiate between mitigation 
and adaptation, the analysis includes only abstracts of articles which elaborate on either 
mitigation or adaptation.6  
Graph 1 and Graph 2 are based on this ‘abstract-analysis’. As the analysis included more 
studies of mitigation than of adaptation, the results for mitigation are probably more robust. A 
complete table of the analysis can be found in the annex. 
Three key motivators for local mitigation policies are the possibility to achieve ‘cost savings’ 
and improve ‘air quality’, and the perceived ‘vulnerability’ to climate change impacts. 
‘Vulnerability’ is a primary motivator for local adaptation policies, too. Key motivators for 
adaptation further include a desire for ‘smart growth’, which in the case of developing 
countries can be interpreted as a commitment to social development, internal pressure and the 
hope to improve a city’s reputation by the activity. The surprise here may be that vulnerability 
to climate change is not only a key motivator for adaptation, but also for mitigation. This may 
be due to the fact, that if climate change becomes an obvious problem for a city, the necessity 
for mitigation policies becomes also more evident. 
Barriers to local climate governance also differ between mitigation and adaptation policies. 
The collective action problem (Tragedy of the Commons) is among the key challenges for 
cities’ emission reduction policies. As a consequence, co-benefits of local climate policies 
become important motivators for cities’ mitigation activities. Mitigation policies are 
                                                 
6 Of course, this reduces the number of abstracts that entered the analysis. On the one hand, this may make the results of the 
abstract-analysis less robust. On the other hand, a clear distinction between adaptation and mitigation may add to the quality 
of the results, as it allows for a better understanding. 
 
Graph 1: Relevance of motivators 
 
 
Source: literature review, motivators as cited in 
abstracts 
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frequently constrained by inappropriate legal frameworks and a lack of effective cooperation 
between the city government and other policy levels. Furthermore, local governments often 
lack the financial resources which would be necessary for more ambitious mitigation policies. 
Control over local utilities is found to be another decisive factor for the success of local 
mitigation policies. Cities with control over their utilities are reported to be more successful in 
local climate governance. Financial resources matter for adaptation policies, too. In addition, 
key barriers for adaptation include the lack of leadership persons, of political support, of 
expertise and of cooperation with local stakeholders. 
One can conclude that financial considerations play an important role in local climate policy-
making. This includes the hope of local governments to achieve cost savings by energy 
efficiency measures, and budget constraints as a barrier to more costly climate action. When 
adaptation is motivated by a desire to reduce vulnerability, this includes a financial aspect, 
too: Climate change impacts are associated with high financial and social costs. Another 
obvious connection is between the high relevance of the collective action problem for 
mitigation policies, and the importance of co-benefits as motivating such policies. This is not 
new to practitioners like ICLEI, who count on the interest of cities in co-benefits as an 
important motivator for climate action (ICLEI 2008, p6). 
However, the importance of co-benefits for local mitigation activities raises some questions. 
Firstly, measures that are implemented for their co-benefits may not be most effective in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For example, the London congestion charge was 
introduced to reduce air pollution and traffic congestion. While it also has climate effects, 
these effects are rather marginal (Bulkeley, Schröder 2009, p358f.). Secondly, if costs and 
benefits play such an important role, why aren’t all cost-effective measures realized? And 
why is the expertise for cost-benefit analysis in local authorities rather limited? Thirdly, if co-
benefits are the single and most important reason for local governments to take climate action, 
Graph 2: Relevance of barriers 
 
 
Source: literature review, barriers as cited in 
abstracts 
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mitigation activities which do not generate co-benefits may just not happen. However, 
mitigation opportunities that come without costs will probably not be sufficient to achieve 
emission reductions in the range of IPCC requirements (- 80% until 2050 for industrialized 
countries). 
Concerning barriers for local climate governance, it can be concluded that it often seems to be 
a combination of challenges which cities have to meet. Or, put the other way around, one 
finds that successful cities have overcome not only one, but a mixture of barriers. For 
example, political support is obviously important. However, it is not a guarantee for effective 
local climate governance. Rather it seems that it needs to be paired with other factors, such as 
some financial resources, increased public awareness, concentration of competences in the 
city administration, and willingness to evaluate climate policies (Fleming, Webber 2004, 
p770; Kern et al. 2005, p78). 
This article provides an overview of the international literature on local climate governance, 
and the barriers and motivations presented in this literature. It includes case studies and 
country surveys from all contintents. Therefore, the results show a mixed picture, and cannot 
necessarily be transferred to any specific national context. Challenges and motivators seem to 
be highly case-specific. They seem to depend on a variety of issues. An obvious one is the 
respective legal framework and the national culture. Further issues that seem to matter are 
whether a city is a front-runner in climate policy or not, where it is located (e.g. on the coast-
line and thereby affected by climate change directly), if there is energy-intensive industry in a 
city or whether cities are based in high, middle or low income countries (Allmann et al. 2004, 
p280; Brody 2009, p33; Zahran 2009, p544). The perspective of scholars studying a city, and 
the methodologies they use may also have an impact on how they rate the relevance of 
challenges they find. 
Furthermore, the information in this analysis is aggregated. Thus the article did not elaborate 
on the interdependence between motivation/barriers and other factors in more detail. Future 
reasearch might want to (1) break down the scheme of motivation/barriers to specific national 
contexts, (2) find out whether motivation and barriers are different for different climate 
protection measures, or whether and how they depend on a city’s history of climate action, (3) 
collect best practice examples on how cities have overcome barriers and (4) develop a tool for 
analysis of policy instruments targeting local climate governance.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
A large percentage of greenhouse gas emissions originiates from cities, and adaptation action 
is naturally a local issue, too. In order to achieve emission reductions in the range of 60% 
until 2050 and to build climate resilience, nation states will have to lay more emphasis on the 
local level as the implementation level of climate action. While an ambitious and binding 
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international agreement is crucial to achieve emission reductions and advance adaptation, the 
transfer of such an agreement into concrete mitigation and adaptation activities needs to 
include local governments as important partners. 
This article tries to improve the understanding of local climate governance. It provides an 
overview of reasons, why cities take or do not take climate action. On the one hand, it can 
inform local authorities, and possibly help them to overcome certain barriers or make better 
use of their motivators. Further research may elaborate on whether specific sets of motivation 
and barriers call for specific bundles of climate protection measures – and thereby provide 
further guidance for local governments in their climate policy-making: For example, cities 
motivated by cost savings could improve their policy-making if they knew which measures 
can actually deliver cost savings. Local officials in cities that do not have strong political 
support for climate action, could refrain from sensitive measures like ones touching private 
car use. Furthermore, once being aware of the importance of political support, they could also 
focus on building such political support by building capacity among their policy-makers. 
A better understanding of local climate governance may also benefit other policy levels, that 
want to support climate action on the city level. On the one hand, it may inform the design of 
policy instruments targeting the local climate protection potential. Such policy instruments 
would probably have to touch certain barriers or motivations in order to change the behaviour 
of local authorities. The evaluation of such policy instruments could partly be based on the 
concept of motivation and barriers. On the other hand, the concept of motivation and barriers 
provides a basis for the analysis of existing policy instruments that may or may not have an 
influence on local governments. As the reach of such policy instruments is probably regional 
or national, here again, a more thorough understanding of motivation and barriers for local 
climate governance in the national context becomes important. 
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Annex 
 
Results of the analysis of abstracts of the articles studied. 
Note that the category ‘mitigation’ includes only articles that limited themselves to mitigation, 
without considering adaptation. The same applies for the category ‘adaptation’, which 
includes articles on adaptation only. This definition was applied in order to distinguish clearly 
between citations of motivations/barriers to adaptation and those that apply to mitigation. In 
an article on both mitigation and adaptation, the abstract may include obstacles and 
constraints for local climate governance in general, not specifying between adaptation and 
mitigation. 
 
 
Mitigation Adaptation
Cost savings 4 0
Revenues 1 0
Smart growth / local development 0 1
Air quality 3 1
Traffic congestion 1 0
Urban warming 0 0
Social aspects 0 0
External pressure & trickle down 1 0
Internal pressure / incentives 0 1
Reputation 0 1
Trend-setting 1 0
Perceived vulnerability 3 2
Costs of climate policies 0 0
Infrastructure backlog 1 0
Lack of financial resources 6 2
Lack of human resources 2 1
Opportunities generate/access $ 1 0
Path dependency 0 0
Small benefits of climate policies 1 0
Lack of expertise 2 2
Public interest & participation 1 1
Limited monitoring and evaluation 1 0
Little localized information on cc 1 1
Absence of national mandate 0 0
Inappropriate regulatory framework and limited 
competences
7 1
Good local governance 1 0
Internal integration & coordination 3 0
Cooperation: local stake-holders 2 2
Cooperation: regionally 2 0
Cooperation: other policy levels 5 0
Cooperation: city-networks 3 0
Limited control over utilities 5 0
Competitive policy issues 2 0
Conservative culture, consumber behaviour, sacred cows 2 0
Leadership 2 2
Political support 1 2
Short time horizons of decision-making 0 0
Availability and reliability of technologies 0 0
Tragedy of the Commons / Collective action dilemma 7 0
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